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(MIS)JUDGING INTENT: THE FUNDAMENTAL
ATTRIBUTION ERROR IN FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAW
VICTOR

D.

QUINTANILLA*

"We need to see that biases and prejudices and conditions of
attention affect the judge's reasoning as they do the reasoning of ordinary men.

. . .

The study of human nature in

law ... may not only deepen our knowledge of legal institutions but open an unworked mine ofjudicial wisdom.....
judges will go far. . . when they begin to procure, and to rely
on, carefully preparedfactual data as to the social setting of
the cases which come before them for decision. "
- Jerome Frank, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, -

146 (1930).
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INTRODUCTION
Growth in the field of social psychology has broadened
our understanding of human nature and deepened our appreciation for how people attribute causality, intent, and blame.
This scientific progress calls for reexamination of the intuitions behind legal concepts such as intent, mens rea, malice,
and scienter.
This article focuses on a reexamination of scienter, one of
the most consequential elements of a claim of federal securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. Scienter is the defendants' intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.' I examine the interaction between scienter
and the Supreme Court's decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,2 from a social-psychological perspective.
Scienter is the subject of robust debate among the Courts
of Appeals. In Tellabs, the Supreme Court weighed in on this
debate and interpreted the requirement under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") that complaints must set forth facts giving rise to a "strong inference" of
scienter. 3 In so doing, the Supreme Court instructed federal
courts to dismiss federal securities complaints, unless a reasonable person would deem the inference of fraudulent intent to
be cogent, and at least as compelling as any opposite inference
one could draw from factual allegations in the complaint.4 A
central teaching of Tellabs is that federal district courts must
contrast both culpable and nonculpable inferences of intent at
1. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).

2. 551 U.S. 308 (2007)
3. Id. at 322-24.
4. Id.
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the motion to dismiss stage of litigation. The Courts of Appeals, however, debate whether the Tellabs framework applies
at summary judgment.5
Social science should illuminate and guide the debate. 6 It
has been aptly said that we are "in the midst of a flowering of
large-scale quantitative studies of fact and outcome," one that
has yielded a New Legal Realism-an effort to understand judicial decision-making on the basis of hypotheses tested by
data.7 One aspect of this New Legal Realism is pragmatism
rooted in scientific experimentation, a pragmatism that tests
the formulation and interpretation of legal rules against the
best available evidence of human behavior.8 This form of
pragmatism has been termed "Behavioral Realism" in the law.9
5. See infra Section II.C.
6. See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw 73 (Yale
Univ. Press 1924) [hereinafter CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw] ("Not
logic alone, but logic supplemented by the social sciences becomes the instrument of advance. We may frame our conclusions for convenience as universal propositions. We are to remember that in truth they are working hypotheses.").
7. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI.
L. REv. 831, 831 (2008); see also Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal
Realism: "Things Ain't What They Used To Be," 2005 Wis. L. REv. 365, 385-87
(2005); Howard Erlanger et al., Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 Wis.
L. REv. 335, 337 (2005) ("[Nlew legal realist scholars bring together legal
theory and empirical research to build a stronger foundation for understanding law and formulating legal policy.").
8. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL.
L. REv. 969, 972-73 (2006); Erlanger, supra note 7.
9. The concept of "Behavioral Realism" as used in this article was introduced at a symposium in July 2006 discussing how advances in social and
cognitive psychology lend new perspective to jurisprudence under federal
antidiscrimination laws and the Equal Protection Clause. After the symposium, jurists and social and cognitive psychologists produced several noteworthy articles: Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit
Bias: Scientific Foundations,94 CAL. L. REv. 945 (2006); Linda H. Krieger &
Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit
Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2006); Jerry Kang &
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of Affirmative
Action, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1063 (2006); ChristineJolls & Cass Sunstein, The Law
of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REv. 969 (2006); Linda H. Krieger, BehavioralRealism in Law: Reframing the DiscussionAbout Social Science's Place in Antidiscrimination Law and Policy, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN
THE COURTROOM 383 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008). See also
HuNTINGTON CAIRNS, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCEs (1935) ("The development of the synthesis of law and psychology will be a long and perhaps a
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When legal doctrines draw implicitly on theories of human nature and conduct, those doctrines should evolve and grow with
the advances in relevant fields of scientific inquiry which examine that human conduct.' 0
In this regard, the legal concept of intent draws on a rudimentary theory of human nature. The sine qua non of the most
severe judicial decrees is a determination that unlawful conduct was intentional. Whether a defendant will be deprived of
life, liberty, or property often turns on whether ajudge or jury
believes that the accused intended wrongful conduct and the
consequences of that conduct." Yet our legal intuitions are
shaped by the assumption that humans are self-interested beings who behave as free moral agents and who make rational
choices. 12 Woven throughout our jurisprudence is the theory
tedious process; but it is a process, however much patience it may require,
which for the law will yield a fruitful harvest.").
10. Improving upon legal doctrine through the social sciences, and in
particular, the field of psychology, reflects the program of early Legal Realists. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); John H.
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and EmpiricalSocial Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 459, (1979). The resurgence is reflected by jurists
and scholars who draw on cognitive and social psychological advances to
improve federal antidiscrimination jurisprudence. SeeJolls & Sunstein, supra
note 9. The resurgence is reflected also by the work of behavioral economists. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998); Russell B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051 (2000).
11. The concepts of culpability and blameworthiness are central to punitive decrees. In Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952), the Supreme Court admonished that "the contention that an injury can amount to
a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion.
It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom
of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil." This admonishment parallels findings
of social and cognitive psychologists who have evidenced that humans tend
to attribute responsibility and blameworthiness when they perceive conduct
to be intentional. See KELLY G. SHAVER, THE ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME: CAUSAL-

(1985).

rry, RESPONSIBILITY, AND BLAMEWORTHINESS

12. See, e.g.,

RoSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF

LAw 44-45 (1922) ("In the growing law of the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries [natural rights and the ideal form of the law] were but guides to
lead growth into definite channels and insure continuity and permanence in
the development of rules and doctrines.

.

..

[T]he point was .

.

. that he

should use his hand freely and skillfully to shape rules and doctrines and
institutions that they might be instruments of achieving the ideal of human
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that humans are motivated to act out of self-interest and that
every individual is rational and selfish. This "rational actor
model" has been grafted onto the broad branches of ourjurisprudence.13 In short, judging is shaped by the assumption
that self-interest and dispositions are the primary causes of
human behavior.14
Decades of research in the field of social psychology, however, have shown that forces larger than dispositions and selfinterest shape human nature and conduct.15 Chief among
those forces is the power of the social situation and environment. 16 This empirical research has called into question theoexistence in a "state of nature." For the state of nature, let us remember, was
a state which expressed the ideal of man as a rational creature."). This philosophy underpins much of classical liberal political theory as well. John
Locke theorized, for example: "[W]e must consider what state all men are
naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and
dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bound
of the law of nature; without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any
other man. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is
reciprocal, no one having more than another." JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES
OF GOVERNMENT 131-32 (C. Baldwin Printer 1824) (1690).
13. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 21-22 (4th ed.
1992) (providing a history of the law and economics movement); Christine
Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A BehavioralApproach to Law and
Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAw AND EcoNoMics 13, 14 (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000).
14. Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law,
1997 Wis. L. REv. 433, 434 ("Law and economics has been one of the most
successful innovations in the legal academy in the last century... By the early
1990s, economic analysis suffused modem legal education, even one devoid
of an explicit course in law and economics.").
15. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARv. L. REv 1110,
1123 (2006) ("[W]ork in cognitive psychology and economics have catalogued the differences between homo sapiens and homo economicus. For their
part, social psychologists have shown that social influences often amplify cognitive errors. Bounded rationality, interact[s] with social influences . . . .");
RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 68 (Harvard Univ. Press 2010)

[hereinafter, POSNER, HowJUDGEs THINK] ("In other words, people (literally
and figuratively) see things differently, and the way in which they see things
changes in response to changes in the environment. That is true of
judges.").
16. See Mahzarin R. Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. AGENDA 8,
8 (2001); see generally Shelley E. Taylor, The Social Being in Social Psychology, in
1 THE 1HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 58, 58 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds.,
4th ed. 1998) ("[F]irst ... individual behavior is strongly influenced by the
environment, especially the social environment. The person does not function in an individualistic vacuum. but in a social context that influences
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ries that describe human behavior solely in terms of self-interest. Subtle changes to norms and social environments lead to
marked and spontaneous changes in human behavior.1 7
Social-psychological research, moreover, has shown that
decision-makers systematically misattribute blame and intent:
overestimating the role of dispositions (i.e., personality, traits,
attitudes, character) and underestimating the role of social influences.' 8 Professor Lee Ross termed this systematic bias the
FundamentalAttribution Error.1 9 Social psychologists and cognitive psychologists conducted research on attribution theories
in the 1970s and 1980s, 2 0 involving the study of how decisionmakers explain human behavior-their causal attributions.
Scientists advanced normative models for how decision-makers
ought to make attributions. And by testing these normative
models against actual decision-making, researchers identified
regular, systematic biases in how humans attribute causality
and intent. 2 1 Of great significance among these biases is the
Fundamental Attribution Error.
In light of the Fundamental Attribution Error, what is
called for is reconstruction of legal concepts such as intent,
thought, feeling, and action.... [S]econd ... the individual actively construes social situations. We do not respond to environments as they are but
as we interpret them to be."); LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON
AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 34 (1991) [hereinafter Ross & NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION]; ELLIOT ARONSON,
THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 9 (1995) ("The social psychologist studies social situations that affect people's behavior."); Robert B. Cialdini & Melanie R. Trost,
Social Influence: Social Norms, Conformity, and Compliance, in 2 THE HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 151, 151-52, (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed.
1998) [hereinafter Cialdini, Social Influence]; Kurt Lewin, Behavior and Development as a Functionof the Total Situation (1946), reprinted in RESOLVING SOCIAL
CONFLICTS & FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 337-38 (APA 2d ed. 2000).
17. See Sunstein, supra note 15.
18. See discussion infra Section III.A.
19. See Ross & NIsBErr, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION, supra note 16, at

4.
20. See Miles Hewstone, Attribution Theories, in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLO6671 (Antony S.R. Manstead & Miles Hewstone
eds., 1996) (collecting social psychological studies).
21. See, e.g., RICHARD E. NISBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 416 (Prentice Hall 1980)
PEDIA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

[hereinafter NISBETr, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUDGMENT].
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foreseeability, mens rea, malice, and scienter. 22 These concepts should be recalibrated and operationalized to decrease
the likelihood that judicial decision-makers will misattribute
intent by increasing the likelihood that they will consider
whether social situations, social norms, and subtle changes to
environments caused behavior.2 3
This article examines one such concept for recalibration:
the intent to deceive and defraud-scienter-under Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 and the circuit split on whether the Tellabs framework should apply at summary judgment.2 4 When
federal district courts evaluate allegedly intentional wrongful
conduct, the Tellabs framework broadens the epistemic inquiry
at summary judgment. It reduces the likelihood that courts
will, after business calamity in hindsight, be subtly influenced
by the stereotype that corporate executives are driven by greed
and increase the likelihood that judicial decision-makers will
compare and contrast dispositional inferences against situational explanations. The Tellabs framework allows federal
judges to consider the force of social situations and environments on the accused. It therefore mitigates the Fundamental
Attribution Error.2 5 Further, application of Tellabs at summary
22. Scholars have discussed the Fundamental Attribution Error in the
context of criminal law, mainly examining the notion that judges and juries
tend to under attribute the force of situational factors on the accused. See,
e.g., David Dripps, FundamentalRetribution Error: CriminalJusticeand the Social
Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1383 (2003). The present law review
article offers not only a description of the psychology behind judging scienter, but a prescription. To remedy the Fundamental Attribution Error,
judges and juries should explicitly consider how social norms, social situations, and environments influenced the conduct of the accused.
23. This is not to say that humans do not act out of self-interest. Behavioral law and economists, however, recognize bounded rationality and the
bounded nature of self-interest. SeeJolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 13,
at 14. They recognize that social norms and situations strongly interact with
perceptions of self-interest and, most importantly, behavior. The social-psychological program proposed, here, views the connection between subtle
changes to situations and human behavior first, without resorting to selfinterest per se. The field of social psychology has shown that social contexts,
situations, and situational norms affect human behavior in significant ways,
often unconsciously and spontaneously. This program directly examines
how social-psychological research illuminates our jurisprudential thinking
and how this research lends itself to the reconstruction of our jurisprudence.
24. See discussion infra Section II.C.
25. Douglas S. Krull, Does the Grist Change the Mill? The Effect of the Per
ceiver's InferentialGoal on the Process of Social Inference, 340 PERS. Soc. PSYCHOL.
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judgment in the federal securities context is consistent with
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and modern
summary judgment jurisprudence. 2 6
The degree to which the Fundamental Attribution Error
skews attributions of blame and intent is an empirical question, one that has been examined extensively.2 7 Whether the
Tellabs framework sufficiently rectifies the Fundamental Attribution Error, however, is an empirical question that warrants
future social-psychological research. 28 Federal judges serve as
gatekeepers in a number of litigation stages, including the motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment stages.
What is called for is empirical research, both qualitative and
quantitative, that describes and evaluates judicial decisionmaking at these various litigation stages, as well as research examining the inferences judges draw, their use of heuristics,
and the strategies and potential shortcomings of their social
judgment. This empirical research should focus on the gap
between "law in books and law in action," between folk theories that describe how judges apply legal precepts in a formalistic, a priori, deductive fashion and social-psychological accounts that more accurately describe judicial decision-

BULL. 345 (1993); Oscar Yabarra & Walter G. Stephan, Attributional Orienta-

tions and the Prediction of Behavior: The Attribution-PredictionBias, 76J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 718, 718 (1999); Aaron C. Kay, S. Christian Wheeler &

Dirk Smeesters, The Situated Person:Effects of Construct Accessibility on Situation
Construals and InterpersonalPerception, 44J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 275,
275 (2008); see discussion infra Section III.A.
26. See infra Section IV.
27. See infra Section III.
28. A fruitful area for subsequent study lies in the gap between the folk
narrative on how legal precepts are ostensibly applied by federal district
courts in formalistic, a priori, and deductive fashion and how social-psychological research suggests that judicial-decision makers actually decide cases.
See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12, 15
(1910) ("[I]f we look closely, distinctions between law in the books and law
in action, between the rules that purport to govern the relations of man and
those that in fact govern them, will appear, and it will be found that today
also the distinction between legal theory and judicial administration is often
a very real and a very deep one."); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic jurisprudence-the Next Step, 30 COL. L. REV. 431, 450 (1930) ("One seeks the real
practice on the subject . .. One seeks an understanding of actual judicial
behavior . . . .").
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making. 29 As described below, to date, sufficient social-psychological research has been amassed to propose that Tellabs
should be incorporated at the summary judgment stage.
I.
SECTION

A.

10 (B),

SCIENTER, AND THE

PSLRA

Brief Background on Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5

After the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Congress aimed to advance a philosophy of full disclosure in public offerings, to protect investors against fraud and
to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing in the
national securities markets.3 0 Congress created the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to enforce the Exchange
Act. The Exchange Act grants the SEC broad regulatory
power, including the power to enact regulations banning manipulation or deception in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities.3 1
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes unlawful the
use or employment of "any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance" in contravention of the SEC's rules. Congress
intended that the SEC robustly enforce the Exchange Act and
use Section 10(b) as a catch-all to thwart new and cunning
fraudulent schemes. 32
29. Several scholars and jurists have begun fruitful research on this question. See infra note 121.
30. See generally SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186-87 (1963).
31. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10, 48 Stat.
881 [hereinafter Exchange Act] (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a78kk (1982 & Supp. V 1987)); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 766 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385, 391 (1990); 1
ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON
SECURITIEs FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 2:15 (2d ed. 2005).
32. One of the drafters of the Exchange Act described the SEC's broad
authority under Section 10(b):
Subsection (c) says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices.' * * * Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to prevent
manipulative devices. I do not think there is any objection to that
kind of a clause. The Commission should have the authority to deal
with new manipulative devices.
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Shortly after the passage of the Exchange Act, the SEC
exercised its regulatory power by enacting Rule 10b-5. 3 3 Rule
lOb-5 defines the manipulative and deceptive devices actionable under Section 10(b). Rule lOb-5 implements Section
10(b) by making it unlawful, in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities, to employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud; to make material misstatements or conceal material information; or to engage in any act, practice, or course of
business that operates as fraud.3 4
Federal courts forged an implied private cause of action
under Rule lOb-5.35 This private cause of action is now well
established.56 In recent years, however, Congress and the Supreme Court have retrenched the private cause of action and
placed greater emphasis on SEC enforcement of Rule lOb-5.37
Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearing on H.R 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the H.
Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1934), reprinted in 7
ELLENBERGER & MAIAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Item 23 (1973).
33. Exchange Act Release No. 3230, 7 Fed. Reg. 3804 (May 21, 1942); 17
C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2008).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see generally Douglas M. Branson, Prescienceand
Vindication: Federal Courts, SEC Rule 10b-5, and the Work of David S. Ruder, 85
Nw. U. L. REv. 613 (1991).
35. The first reported civil action based upon Rule lob-5 was Kardon v.
NationalGypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (motion to dismiss). See
generally Milton Freeman, Remarks at Conference on Codification of the
Federal Securities Laws (Nov. 18, 1966), in 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967);
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 729 ("[T]he history of this provision [does not]
provide any indication that Congress considered the problem of private suits
under it at the time of its passage.").
36. See Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983)
("The existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure.").
37. Some have asserted that the implied remedy under Rule 10b-5 is consistent with the private attorney general model. The private attorney general
model stands for the proposition that private enforcement under Rule lOb-5
serves as a necessary supplement to the SEC's efforts in deterring fraud. The
private attorney general model holds that the implied action efficiently permits class action attorneys to sue defendants on behalf of a class of investors
who either cannot afford the costs of litigation or whose stake is so small that
litigation would not be cost effective. See James D. Cox, Making Securities
Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARiz. L. REv. 497 (1997). Others, however,
have asserted that the effect of private enforcement under Rule lOb-5 is a
misalignment of incentives between class members and class counsel. They
have recommended a consolidated approach with enforcement authority
placed exclusively in a federal agency such as the SEC. See generally Amanda
M. Rose, The MultienforcerApproach to Securities FraudDeterrence:A CriticalAnalysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173 (2010) [hereinafter, Rose, The Multienforcer Ap-
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Scienter and the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995

In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,38 the Supreme Court concluded that to prevail under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5
plaintiffs must prove scienter. Up until that point, jurists had
differed on whether scienter was a necessary element and on
whether negligence alone was sufficient for civil liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 3 9 The Supreme Court reviewed
the text and legislative history of Section 10(b) and found that
the language of Section 10(b) strongly suggests that Congress
intended to prohibit only knowing or intentional misconduct.
The Supreme Court found that the term "manipulative," in
Section 10(b), connotes intentional or willful conduct-conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors. 40 The Supreme
Court aimed to avoid civil liability in situations where an accused acted in good faith but harmed investors-situations
that appear unreasonable only in hindsight. 4 1 The Supreme
Court concluded that civil liability under Section 10(b) required proof of "scienter," and that scienteris a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 4 2
After Hochfelder federal courts held that Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governed whether a plaintiff
had sufficiently pleaded federal securities fraud. 43 The Courts
proach]; Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring
the RelationshipBetween Public and PrivateEnforcement ofRule 10b-5, 108 COLUM.
L. REv. 1301, 1312-18 (2008) [hereinafter, Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation
Reform] ;John C. Coffee,Jr., Rescuing the PrivateAttorney General: Why the Model
of the Lawyer As Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215 (1983); Carl
W. Hittinger &Jarod M. Bona, The DiminishingRole of the PrivateAttorney General in Antitrust and Securities Class Action Cases Aided by the Supreme Court, 4 J.
Bus. & TECH. L. 167, 172 (2009).
38. 425 U.S. 185 (1973).
39. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12, 197 n.17 (1976) (citing conflicting case law and authorities).
40. See id. at 197-205.
41. See id. at 198.
42. See id. at 193 n.12.
43. See, e.g., Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1127 (2d Cir.
1994). Rule 9(b) reads:
Fraud, Mistake; Condition of Mind. In alleging fraud or mistake, a
party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions
of a person's mind may be alleged generally.
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of Appeals, however, diverged when applying Rule 9(b). The
Ninth Circuit allowed plaintiffs to plead simply that defendants had acted with scienter, but required plaintiffs to set forth
the circumstances constituting fraud (i.e., the time, place, and
nature of the alleged fraudulent activities). 4 4 In contrast, the
Second Circuit concluded that plaintiffs were required to
plead the defendants' state of mind with particularity and to
plead facts giving rise to a "strong inference of fraudulent intent."4 5
These divergent standards led to divergent outcomes
across federal jurisdictions. Generally, unless a federal district
court dismisses a frivolous private securities action or grants
summary judgment, settlement is the result. 46 It was, therefore, substantially more likely in the Ninth Circuit than in the
Second that defendants would be forced to settle an unmeritorious lawsuit.
Consequently, in 1995, Congress recast the landscape of
securities fraud litigation by enacting the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").47 Congress determined that
frivolous strike suits had increased the costs of raising capital
and chilled corporate disclosures.4 8 It aimed to curb abuse of
R. Civ. P. 9(b).
44. See, e.g., Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1995); In re
GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994).
45. See Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128; Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 267
(2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Shields' two pronged strong inference test of pleading test to show either motive and opportunity or circumstantial evidence of
misbehavior or recklessness).
46. See infra Section II.D.
47. Pub L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
48. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, 43 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 742 ("Shareholders are also damaged due to the chilling
effect of the current system on the robustness and candor of disclosure."); S.
REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 ("The
Committee heard substantial testimony that today certain lawyers file frivolous 'strike' suits alleging violations of the Federal securities laws in the hope
that defendants will quickly settle to avoid the expense of litigation. These
suits, which unnecessarily increase the cost of raising capital and chill corporate disclosure, are often based on nothing more than a company's announcement of bad news, not evidence of fraud.")
For additional analysis of the Reform Act's legislative history, see John
W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAw. 335, 347-53 (1996);
FED.
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the private cause of action under Section 10(b) and to discourage the filing of securities class actions of dubious merit designed to exact large settlement recoveries. 49 Moreover, Congress recognized that the Courts of Appeals had fashioned divergent standards when assessing the sufficiency of federal
securities complaints and aimed to establish uniform and
more stringent pleading requirements for private securities litigation.5 0
The PSLRA contains several provisions intended to reduce vexatious lawsuits. For present purposes, the most relevant is Section 21D(b) (2) of the PSLRA:
(2) Required State of Mind - In any private action
arising under [the Securities Exchange Act of 1934]
in which the plaintiff may recover money damages
only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect
to each act or omission alleged to violate [the 1934
Act], state with particularityfacts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind.5 '

In enacting the PSLRA, Congress rejected the Ninth Circuit's lenient pleading standard and instead drew from the
Second Circuit, adopting its "strong inference" standard.5 2
The "strong inference" requirement fashioned a stricter nationwide pleading standard for pleading scienter.5 3 Congress
Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities
Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 288-98 (1998); Joel Seligman,
The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 Aiz. L. REv. 717 (1996).
49. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313
(2007); H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 ("Congress has been prompted by significant evidence of abuse in private securities lawsuits to enact reforms to
protect investors and maintain confidence in our capital markets."); S. REP.
No. 104-98, at 15.
50. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 320; H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (1998) (emphasis added). The PSLRA further provides that a "court shall, on the motion of any defendant, dismiss the
complaint if the requirements of [§ 21D(b) (2)] are not met." Id. at § 78u4 (b) (3) (a).
52. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 ("Regarded as the most stringent
pleading standard, the Second Circuit requirement is that the plaintiff state
facts with particularity, and that these facts, in turn, must give rise to a
'strong inference' of the defendant's fraudulent intent.").
53. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41).
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did not aim to eliminate private federal securities class actions,
but rather to require federal courts to screen out less meritorious lawsuits. Before allowing plaintiffs to fully impose the
costs of defending a securities class action and thereby granting plaintiffs the strike value of federal securities lawsuits, federal district courts must evaluate whether plaintiffs have, in
fact, made a heightened showing of intentional misconduct. 54
Congress also elevated the motion to dismiss stage to a
crucial adjudication point in private federal securities litigation.5 5 Section 21D(b) (3) (A) of the PSLRA states that, "the
court shall, on the motion of any defendant, dismiss the complaint if the requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) are not
met." Congress contemplated that federal courts would use
the strong inference standard as a means to filter out unmeritorious federal securities lawsuits. 5 6 The locus of decisionmaking shifted to federal judges. Judges now serve as gatekeepers who screen out complaints, thereby minimizing the
strike value of unfounded allegations and preserving the
court's time and limited resources. Several empirical studies
suggest that the PSLRA's heightened pleading standards have
increased the dismissal of unmeritorious suits. 5 7
54. See Carl W. Hittinger &Jarod M. Bona, supra note 37, at 182. Professor Mukesh Bajaj has shown that the PSLRA decreased the number of cases
that defendants settle to avoid the costs of discovery and the reputational
harms associated with litigation. See Mukesh Bajij, Sumon Mazumdar, Atulya
Sarin, EmpiricalAnalysis: Securities Class Action Settlements, 43 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 1001, 1032-33 (2003).
55. See generally A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud?
An Empirical Study of Motions To Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD., 125, 128 (2005) [hereinafter, Pritchard, Motions to Dismiss] (explaining that the motion to dismiss affects discovery and settlement).
56. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324.
57. Compare David M. Levin & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California's Blue Sky Laws, 54
Bus. LAw. 1, 40 (1998) (citing Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d
Cong. (1994) (testimony of ProfessorJoel Seligman, University of Michigan
Law School)), withJoseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REv. 627, 691 (2002). See generally Michael A. Perino, Did the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 913, 923-29
(2003) (asking whether Congress has achieved the primary goals of the
PSLRA); Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson & Adam C. Pritchard, The
Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (Univ. of
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II.
VYING APPROACHES AND VEXING CIRCUIT SPLITS

A.

Pre-Tellabs Circuit Split at the Motion To Dismiss Stage

When enacting the PSLRA, Congress left the key phrase
"strong inference" undefined. As a result, Courts of Appeals
diverged on the meaning of the phrase and on whether it permitted federal courts to contrast competing inferences of intent. This divide originated from the tension between how
federal courts had customarily adjudicated motions to dismiss
under Rule 12(b) (6) and the dictates of the PSLRA. Under
Rule 12(b) (6), federal district courts had afforded plaintiffs
wide latitude when adjudicating motions to dismiss. Until
quite recently, federal courts drew all reasonable inferences in
favor of plaintiffs, without contrasting inferences drawn from
allegations.5 8 The split, therefore, centered on whether federal courts were permitted to contrast attributions of intent
drawn from factual allegations. Some Courts of Appeals allowed federal district courts to evaluate only whether an attribution of culpable intent could be drawn from the factual allegations, while others required federal district courts to compare and contrast both culpable and nonculpable attributions
of intent. As will be discussed shortly, the first approach would
likely result in the Fundamental Attribution Error, while the
latter would reduce its effect.
In interpreting the "strong inference" language, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that federal district courts
were permitted to consider only inferences of culpability drawn
from plaintiffs' allegations-that is, only inferences favorable
Mich. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 07-008, Feb.
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=
975301 (examining the affects of the PSLRA on filing and settling of securities litigation claims).
58. The U.S. Supreme Court has since altered federal pleading practice
greatly. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) ("Determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of
Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007) ("[Conley's 'no set of facts'] is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard
. . . ."). See generally Arthur Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double
Play on the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,60 DuKE L.J. 1, 1-17 (Oct. 2010).
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to the plaintiffs' position.'5 It concluded that such a standard
would eviscerate the PSLRA's strong inference requirement by
allowing plaintiffs to plead in a vacuum.6 0 Federal district
courts, therefore, were to consider all reasonable inferences
drawn from plaintiffs' allegations-both culpable and
nonculpable inferences. Moreover, federal district courts were
to consider all allegations in their entirety, together with any
reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, including whether, on balance, plaintiffs' complaint gives rise to the
requisite inference of scienter. 6 ' The Sixth Circuit went further, requiring federal district courts to grant dismissal unless
the inference of culpability was the most plausible of competing
inferences. 62
Unlike the Ninth and the Sixth Circuits, the Tenth Circuit
required federal district courts to consider both culpable and
nonculpable inferences of intent, but to refrain from weighing
them. 63 It concluded that federal district courts must consider
the culpable inference suggested by plaintiffs, while acknowledging a possible nonculpable inference, and then consider
whether the culpable inference is strong in light of the overall
context.6 4
The Seventh Circuit also fashioned a standard that barred
federal district courts from weighing culpable and
nonculpable inferences of intent.65 When Tellabs was first decided by the Seventh Circuit, the Seventh Circuit required federal district courts to deny defendants' motion to dismiss
where plaintiffs alleged facts from which a reasonable person
could infer that the defendants acted with the required intent.66 It permitted federal district courts to grant dismissal
only where a reasonable person could not draw a culpable inference from the alleged facts. Like the Tenth Circuit, the
59. See Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 896-97 (9th Cir. 2002).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2001).
63. See Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003).
64. Id.
65. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601-03
(7th Cir. 2006), vacated, 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
66. Id. at 602.
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Seventh Circuit aimed to avoid intrusion on the role of the

jury as finder of fact.6 7
B.

Tellabs at the Motion To Dismiss Stage

In Tellabs, shareholders filed a private securities action
under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, alleging securities
fraud.6 8 They alleged that Tellabs and its president, Richard
Notebaert, made false statements about revenue and demand
for Tellabs' popular product. The shareholders claimed that
they had relied on those statements and were harmed when
share prices dropped following public disclosure of the inaccuracy of Tellabs' reports and projections. The federal district
court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that although plaintiffs had pleaded that defendants' statements
were misleading, they failed to plead facts from which a strong
inference could be drawn that alleged misstatements were
made with fraudulent intent. The Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding that the shareholders had alleged facts from which a
reasonable person could infer that the defendants acted with
scienter. 69
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the Circuit split on whether, and to what extent, a federal district
court can and must consider competing inferences of intent
when adjudicating whether the allegations of fraud in a private
federal securities complaint give rise to a "strong inference" of
scienter. 70
Justice Ginsburg described the Court's task as fashioning
a workable construction of the "strong inference" standard
that would meet the PSLRA's twin goals: curbing frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation while preserving investors' ability to recover on meritorious claims. 7 ' The strength of an inference
cannot be decided in a vacuum; it is inherently comparative,
reasoned the Court.7 2 The evaluation turns on how likely it is
that one conclusion, as compared to others, follows from the
underlying facts. Therefore, federal courts must consider
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
Id. at 317.
Id. at 317-18.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 322-23.
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plausible, nonculpable explanations for the defendants' conduct, as well as inferences favoring the plaintiffs when evaluating whether factual allegations give rise to the requisite strong
inference of fraudulent intent.73
The Supreme Court described the test as follows: when
evaluating federal securities complaints for a strong inference
of scienter, federal district courts must evaluate whether the inference
is cogent and compelling, and thus strong in light of other explana-

tions. The Court instructed federal district courts to dismiss
federal securities complaints unless a reasonable person would
deem the attribution of fraudulent intent cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposite attribution one could draw from the facts
alleged.7 4

The Supreme Court, moreover, rejected the Seventh Circuit's formulation, which had barred a comparative inquiry. It
concluded that the Seventh Circuit's concern about usurping
the jury's role was undue.7 5 The Seventh Amendment is not
violated by requiring federal district judges to engage in a
comparative assessment of plausible inferences, while constantly assuming plaintiffs' factual allegations to be true. This
comparative assessment does not force plaintiffs to plead more
than they would be required to prove at trial. At trial, plaintiffs would be required to demonstrate that it is more likely
than not that the defendants had acted with scienter. 76 The
Court explained, moreover, that in numerous contexts federal
judges serve as gatekeepers who prevent submission of claims
to a jury without running afoul of the Seventh Amendment
(e.g. Federal Rule of Evidence 601, judgment as a matter of
law, and summary judgment).7
Justices Scalia and Alito filed concurring opinions proposing a more rigorous standard.78 They would have required
federal district courts to dismiss federal securities complaints,
unless the culpable inference was more plausible than the
nonculpable inference.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

323-24.
324.
326-7.
328-29.
327 n.8.
329 (Scalia,

J., concurring), 333-34 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Post-Tellabs Circuit Split at Summary judgment

While Tellabs resolved the split at the motion to dismiss
stage, the First Circuit and the Ninth Circuit disagree on the
appropriate standard for assessing scienter when evaluating a
motion for summary judgment, and specifically, whether the
PSLRA's heightened pleading standard applies at summary
judgment. There is also a gap between how federal courts say
they evaluate scienter and how courts, in fact, assess scienter at
summary judgment.
The First Circuit has concluded that the PSLRA's heightened standard applies at summary judgment.7 9 In Geffon v.
Micrion Corp., plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated Section 10(b), Rule lOb-5, and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act by making fraudulent statements or omissions in
failing to disclose the details of a large order and how it affected the defendants' backlog. Plaintiffs relied heavily on the
defendant's testimony that the company had interpreted the
term 'book an order' differently for internal purposes than
how it used the term publicly. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that there was no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the statements in question were
misleading or fraudulent. On the issue of scienter, the First
Circuit determined that the 'judicial reasoning applicable to
imposing heightened pleading requirements is at least as
forceful, if not more so, with regard to proof requirements
that a trial court must consider in deciding whether to allow a
motion for summary judgment."8 0
Federal district courts in the First Circuit, therefore, draw
on the strong inference standard and apply the Tellabs framework at summary judgment.8 1 Courts have explained that a
strong inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable at summary judgment-it must be cogent

79. See Geffon v. Micrion Corp., 249 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2001).
80. Id.
81. See SEC v. Goldsworthy, No. 06-10012-JGD, 2007 WL 4730345, at *14
(D. Mass. Dec. 4, 2007) (holding that summary judgment should be denied
as to two defendants, but granted as to a third defendant); KA Invs. LDC v.
No. Nine Visual Tech. Corp., No. 00-10966-DPW, 2002 WL 31194865, at *13
(D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2002) (denying summary judgment).
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and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.8 2
Like the First Circuit, other federal courts have held that,
although the PSLRA and Tellabs dealt with pleading, the underlying rationale of the PSLRA and Tellabs is applicable at
summary judgment.8 3 For example, in Pennmont Securities, the
court determined that Tellabs was "at least instructive in the
summary judgment context" and granted summary judgment.8 4 There, the court held that there must be a strong inference of scienter drawn from all the facts, and additionally,
that the court must take into account plausible competing inferences. The court stated that, under Tellabs, the inference of
scienter must be at least as compelling as any opposing inference on could draw from the facts.8 5
In marked contrast, the Ninth Circuit has determined
that the heightened standard for evaluating scienter does not
apply at the summary judgment stage.8 6 In Howard v. Everex
Systems, plaintiffs filed a federal securities class action under
Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, alleging that the
defendants had fraudulently inflated the price of the company's stock by falsely representing that the company had
achieved profitability and consecutive profit increases. During
trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law
("JMOL") in favor of the defendants on the grounds that the
plaintiffs had not stated a claim within the meaning of Section
10(b) and that the defendants had not acted with the requisite
level of scienter. 7 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
the PLSRA "did not alter the substantive requirements for scienter under Section 10(b)," and "the standard on summary
judgment or JMOL remains unaltered. . . ."
82. See Goldsworthy, 2007 WL 4730345, at *14 (quoting Tellabs, 551 U.S. at
309); KA Invs., 2002 WL 31194865, at *11.
83. See Nolfi v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d 904, 910 (N.D. Ohio
2008) ("The Court notes [in denying summary judgment] that the above
cases deal with the pleading standard requirement for these claims, but finds
that the underlying rationale is applicable to the summary judgment setting
as well.").
84. Pennmont Sec. v. Wallace, No. 06-1646, 2008 WL 834379, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 26, 2008).
85. Id. at *6-7.
86. See Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000).
87. Id. at 1060.

Imaged with
Permission
of N.Y.U.
Law & Business
HeinOnline
-- 7 N.Y.U.
J. L. &Journal
Bus. 214 of
2010-2011

2010]

(MIS)JUDGING INTENT

215

Other federal courts have reached a similar result. In In
re Bristol-Myers Squibb Securities Litigation, the court drew on the
procedural distinction between the pleading stage and the
summary judgment stage to reject a heightened standard at
summary judgment. There the court held that the heightened
standard imposed by the PLSRA does not apply to the substantive burdens at summary judgment. The court explained that
the substantive standard in the Third Circuit calls not for a
"strong inference," but rather for the plaintiff to supply a basis
from which to draw a reasonable inference that defendants acted with the requisite fraudulent intent. The court found that,
at summary judgment, the need to check strike suits is not as
significant as that need at the motion to dismiss stage. The
court ultimately granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion for summary judgment.8 8
The Second Circuit articulated what is, on its face, the
most lenient and least discerning of the standards applied at
summary judgment in Press v. Chemical nv. Ser. Corp.8 9 There,
the Second Circuit explained that it "has been lenient in allowing scienter issues to withstand summary judgment based
on fairly tenuous inferences."9 0 The Second Circuit explained
that it was lenient because whether specific intent existed is
generally a question of fact appropriate for resolution by the
"trier of fact," i.e., thejury. In Press, the Second Circuit articulated this rule in the context of a motion to dismiss. The Second Circuit rejected the district court's decision on scienter
but ultimately affirmed dismissal on other grounds. Nevertheless, Second Circuit district courts have drawn on Press when
denying summary judgment.9 1
But Second Circuit district courts have not applied Press
uniformly. In numerous PSLRA cases in which its federal
courts grant summary judgment, they do not mention Press at
88. In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., No. 00-1990(SRC), 2005 WL
2007004, at *13-14 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2005).
89. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999).
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. See, e.g., In reWorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 472, 500-01
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (denying summary judgment); RMED Int'l., Inc. v. Sloan's
Supermarkets, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 389, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying summary judgment); Buxbaum v. Deutsche Bank AG, 196 F. Supp. 2d 367, 37576 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying summary judgment).
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all.92 Second Circuit courts have held on a number of occasions, on particular facts, that no reasonable jury could find
scienter and have granted summary judgment.9 3
Nor have other federal courts applied the restrictive standard set forth in Press. Indeed, many federal courts recite the
general rule that summary judgment is appropriate where
there is no genuine issue of material fact, while ultimately concluding that summary judgment was appropriate because the
nonmoving party rested on conclusory allegations, improbable
inferences, or unsupported speculation.9 4
D.

Why the Seemingly IntractableProblem Must Be Solved

First, federal courts are the de facto triers of fact-that is,
federal districtjudges screen frivolous pleadings at the motion
to dismiss stage, and summary judgment is the point at which
evidence could, in fact, be reviewed holistically because trials
are so rare. If plaintiffs plead facts creating a strong inference
of fraudulent intent, plaintiffs survive a motion to dismiss. But
if they later fail to set forth evidence of fraudulent intent, and
instead rely only on tenuous circumstantial evidence, the
Ninth and Second Circuits would demand denial of summary
judgment, prompting the next phase of litigation, i.e., trial.9 5
As an empirical matter, however, denial of summary judgment results not in trial, but settlement whether or not defendants are culpable. Trials are exceedingly infrequent.9 6
92. See In re Corning Inc. Sec. Litig., 349 F. Supp. 2d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
Freedman v. Value Health Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 317 (D. Conn 2001); In re N.
Telecom Ltd. Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 2d 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
93. See Freedman, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 342; In re N. Telecom, 116 F. Supp. 2d
at 465.
94. SEC v. Ficken, 546 F.3d 45, 51-53 (1st Cir. 2008) (affirming grant of
summary judgment where no genuine issue of material fact existed); In re
Acceptance Cos. Ins. Sec. Litig., 423 F.3d 899, 905 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming
grant of summary judgment where no genuine issue of material fact existed); In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 2002)
(affirming grant of summary judgment where no genuine issue of material
fact existed).
95. See Press, 166 F.3d at 538; Howard, 228 F.3d at 1064.
96. See Choi et al, supra note 57 (noting that the vast number of securities class actions have either been dismissed or settled); Marc Galanter, The
Hundred-YearDecline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. RE-v. 1255,
1255 (2005) ("The shrinking number of trials is particularly striking because
virtually everything else in the legal world is growing-the population of law-
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For example, the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse reported that approximately 3,052 federal securities class actions were filed between January 1, 1996 and
December 21, 2009.97 During that time only fifteen (15) federal securities class action cases were tried to verdict-one half
of one percent of total cases filed.9 8 Settlement results from
intense structural incentives. On the defendants' side, riskaverse corporate executives settle before trial to preserve coverage under their directors' and officers' liability ("D&O") insurance policies.9 9 D&O policies, however, contain exclusions
for active and deliberate dishonesty and improper personal
benefit.10 0 Deliberate dishonesty is tantamount to scienter
under Section 10(b). If a jury returns a verdict of liability
under Section 10(b), that verdict may well trigger an exclusion
from coverage and personal liability. Risk-averse defendants,
therefore, avoid trial to ensure that insurers will fund their defense. On the plaintiffs' side, the "lodestar method" for calculating fees also results in risk aversion. The method offers
plaintiffs' attorneys little incentive to wager on a favorable verdict, risking the entire fee award they could earn by simply

yers, the number of cases, expenditures on law, the amount of regulation,
the volume of authoritative legal material, and not least the place of law,
lawyers, and courts in public consciousness.")
97. See Cornerstone Research, Cornerstone Research: Securities Class Action
Filings 2009: A Year in Review at 1, available at http://securities.stanford.edu/
clearinghouseresearch/2009_YIR/CornerstoneResearchFilings-2009YIR.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2010).
98. See Risk Metrics Group, Risk Metrics Group: Securities Class Action Services, Securities Class Action Trials in the Post-PSLRA Era,Jan. 2010, available at
http://blog.riskmetrics.com/slw/SCAS%20Trials.pdf (last visited Apr. 29,
2010); cf Pritchard, Motions To Dismiss, supra note 55, at 128 (claiming that
securities fraud class actions rarely go to ajury).
99. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter:Directors' and
Officers Insurance in Securities Settlement, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 755, 796-819
(2009); Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L.
REv. 1465, 1469 (2004); Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Michael
Klausner, Outside Director Liability 18-19 (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin
Program in Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 250, 2003), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=382422.
100. SeeJanet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements
in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 550-53 (1991) [hereinafter,
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?]: Roberta Romano, The ShareholderSuit: Litigation Without Foundation, 7 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 55, 57 (1991).
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settling on the eve of trial.1 0 ' Plaintiffs' attorneys, therefore,
often perceive little benefit to proceeding to trial where a jury
could return an unfavorable verdict and where they could lose
their entire fee and out of pocket expenses as well.
In lieu of trial, settlement will result, but settlements after
summary judgment are linked to a torrent of financial harm to
public companies. Studies suggest that after settlements in
Section 10(b) actions, firms experience liquidity problems,
worsening financial health, and an increased likelihood of
bankruptcy. 0 2 Given these consequences, an over-deterrence
problem looms large. 0 3 Unless federal courts contrast culpable and nonculpable inferences of intent, Rule lOb-5 is in effect converted into a strict liability regime for conduct that appears unreasonable only in hindsight. 104
And second, there is a gulf between the language describing how federal courts adjudicate scienter at summary judgment-Press-and how federal courts, in fact, adjudicate motions for summary judgment. This gulf is particularly striking
when the SEC affirmatively moves for summary judgment.
Second Circuit courts granted summary judgment in approximately 46 percent of cases where defendants moved for summary judgment in private securities actions. 0 5 In marked con101. Unlike a contingent or proportional fee arrangement, the lodestar
method is derived primarily from the number of hours worked, not on the
ultimate recovery. The lodestar method calculates the fee by multiplying the
number of hours worked by a customary hourly rate. Plaintiffs' attorneys
expend the vast majority of billable hours pre-trial. They, therefore, have
little incentive to bill the additional hours spent in trial, especially given that
proceeding to trial may well result in an adverse verdict that would wipe out
their entire attorneys' fee award. See Alexander, Do the Merits Matter, supra
note 100 at 541.
102. See Lynn Bai, James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Lying and Getting
Caught: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Securities Class Action Settlements on
Targeted Firms, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 1877, 1912-13 (2010).
103. See Rose, The Multienforcer Approach, supra note 37, at 2184
("[O]verdeterrence remains a concern to the extent that regulated parties
fear inaccurate prosecution and legal error . . .. [O]verdeterrence produces
some of the very same social costs as securities fraud itself: it can increase the
cost of capital (e.g., if fear of liability causes companies to overinvest in precautionary measures or causes financial intermediaries to charge more for
their services) and upset the allocative efficiency of the economy . . .
104. See infra Section III.B.
105. The sample consists of decisions in the Second Circuit ruling on defendants' motions for summary judgment in private securities fraud class ac-
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trast, Second Circuit courts granted summary judgment in approximately 75 percent of the cases where the SEC moved
affirmatively for summary judgment.' 06 If Press is to be applied
tions, in which scienter was adjudicated. Using exhaustive searches on
Westlaw, I collected what I believe is virtually every available published and
unpublished decision by district courts at the summary judgment stage beginning in 1996 through the end of 2009. My search yielded fifteen decisions. I identified seven cases granting summaryjudgment, six cases denying
summary judgment, and two cases granting in part and denying in part. See
Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal v. Banc of America Sec., LLC, 592
F. Supp. 2d 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting and denying summary judgment
in part); In reWorldcom Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(denying summary judgment); Louros v. Kreicas, 367 F. Supp. 2d 572
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (granting and denying in part); In re Corning, Inc. Sec. Litig., 349 F. Supp. 2d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (granting summary judgment);
Buxbaum v. Deutsche Bank AG, 196 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying summary judgment); RMED Int'l., Inc. v. Sloan's Supermarkets, Inc., 185
F. Supp. 2d 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying summary judgment);
Sedaghatpour v. Doubleclick, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(granting summary judgment); In re Motel 6 Litig., 161 F. Supp. 2d 227
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying summary judgment); Freedman v. Value Health,
Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 317 (D. Conn. 2001) (granting summary judgment);
Gerber v. Computer Assoc., 2000 WL 307379 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2000) (denying summary judgment); In reN. Telecom Ltd. Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 2d
446 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting summary judgment); In re Kidder Peabody
Sec. Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying summary judgment); In re Symbol Techs. Class Action, 950 F. Supp. 1237 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(granting summary judgment); In re Canadiaigua Sec. Litig., 944 F. Supp.
1202 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting summary judgment); Phillips v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 933 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting summary judgment).
106. The sample consists of decisions in the Second Circuit ruling on motions for summary judgment under Section 10(b) where the SEC moved affirmatively for summary judgment and where scienter was adjudicated. Using exhaustive searches on Westlaw, I collected what I believe is every available published and unpublished decision by district courts beginning in 1996
through the end of 2009. I then excluded summary dispositions where the
Commission relied on plea agreements or prior findings from criminal judgments. My search yielded twenty decisions. I identified fifteen cases granting summary judgment for the Commission, three cases denying summary
judgment for the Commission, and two cases granting in part and denying in
part. Compare SEC v. Aragon Capital Management, LLC, 672 F. Supp. 2d 421,
421 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting summary judgment); SEC v. Rabinovich & Assocs., LP, No. 07 Civ. 10547(GEL), 2008 WL 4937360 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18,
2008) (granting summary judgment); SEC v. Pittsford Capital Income Partners, No. 06 Civ 6353 T(P), 2007 WL 2455124, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 23,
2007) (granting summary judgment); SEC v. Grotto, No. 05 Civ. 5880(GEL),
2006 WL 3025878, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2006) (granting summary judg-
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even-handedly in both private and public enforcement cases
and, hence, summary judgment is denied when a "fairly tenuous inference" of culpability exists, this would retrench robust
public enforcement of the Exchange Act. The Press standard
would raise the standard for the SEC's affirmative use of summary judgment. This would unnecessarily force the SEC to
shift litigation resources to discovery and trial in a number of
public enforcement cases that should be decided at summary
judgment where defendants offer only weak explanations for
their conduct. The consequence would be under-enforcement of Rule 10b-5 by the SEC. That result is plainly inconsistent with the modern shift toward public enforcement of the
Exchange Act.10 7 Federal courts must broaden the tools used
by the SEC to combat securities fraud, not blunt them.

ment); SEC v. Save the World Air, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11586(GBD)FM, 2005
WL 3077514, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2005) (granting summary judgment);
SEC v. Mandaci, No. 00 Civ. 6635 LTS FM, 2004 WL 2153879, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2004) (granting summary judgment); SEC v. Roor, No. 99 Civ.
3372(HB), 2004 WL 1933578, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2004) (granting summary judgment); SEC v. Global Telecom Servs., L.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 2d 94,
94 (D. Conn. 2004) (granting summary judgment); SEC v. Batterman, No.
00 Civ. 4835(LAP), 2002 WL 31190171, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002)
(granting summary judgment); SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 195 F. Supp. 2d
475, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting summary judgment); SEC v. Coates, 137
F. Supp. 2d 413, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting summary judgment); SEC v.
Milan Capital Group, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 108(DLC), 2000 WL 1682761, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2000) (granting summary judgment); SEC v. Todt, No. 98
Civ. 3980(JGK), 2000 WL 223836, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2000) (granting
summary judgment); SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 846 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (granting summary judgment), with SEC v. Lyon, 605 F. Supp. 2d 531,
531 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying summary judgment); SEC v. Treadway, 430 F.
Supp. 2d 293, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying summary judgment); SEC v.
Meltzer, 440 F. Supp. 2d 179, 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying summary judgment); SEC v. Thrasher, 152 F. Supp. 2d 291, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying
summary judgment), and SEC v. Universal Express, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d
412, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (granting in part and denying in part); SEC v.
Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 508, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting in part and denying
in part).
107. See generally Hittinger & Bona, supra note 37 (examining the Supreme
Court's encouragement of government enforcers for securities law); Rose,
The Multienforcer Approach, supra note 37; Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation
Reform, supra note 37 (analyzing various enforcement methods).

Imaged with
Permission
of N.Y.U.
Law & Business
HeinOnline
-- 7 N.Y.U.
J. L. &Journal
Bus. 220 of
2010-2011

(MIS)JUDGING INTENT

2010]

221

III.
THE FUNDAMENTAL ArrIBUTION ERROR: OVERESTIMATING
DIsPoSITIONS AND UNDERESTIMATING SITUATIONS

Social psychologists and cognitive psychologists have examined how decision-makers attribute causality, blame, and intent.1 08 They have shown that attribution is marked by distortions of perception and persistent, if unintentional, errors and
biases.1 09 They have also shown that human behavior results
from a combination of personal characteristics and situational
influences, such as social norms and situational constraints.
People make dispositionalattributionswhen they assign causality
to a person's attitudes, characteristics, or personality traits.' 10
People make situationalattfibutions when they assign causality
to the force of a person's circumstances, social situation, or
social environment."1 i Despite the power that situations have
in shaping behavior, observers systematically fail to perceive
the force that situations bear on behavior.11 2 This persistent
bias-the bias of attributing people's behaviors to dispositions,
108. See SUSAN T. FisKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOcIAL COGNITION 23 (2d
ed. 1991) [hereinafter FISKE, SOCIAL COGNITION] ("Attribution theory deals
with how the social perceiver uses information to arrive at causal explanations for events."); ELLIOT ARONSON, TIMOTHY D. WILSON & ROBIN M. AKERT,
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 95 (7th ed. 2010) [hereinafter ARONSON, SOCIAL PsYCHOLOGY].

109. See generally FIsKE, SocIAL COGNITION, supranote 108, at 66; ARONSON,
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 108, at 98.

110. Attributions that assign the cause of behavior dispositions, personality, attitudes, or character are also referred to as "internal attributions." See
ARONSON, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 108, at 95.

111. Situational attributions are also referred to as "external attributions."
See id. at 95.
112. See Ross & NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION, supra note 16, at

125-134; Yaacov Trope & Ruth Gaunt, Processing Alternative Explanations of
Behavior: Correction or Integration?, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 344
(2000); FISKE, SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 108, at 67; Daniel T. Gilbert &
Edward Jones, Perceiver-Induced Constraint:Interpretations of Self-Generated Reality, J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL., 269 (1986); GUSTAV ICHHEISER, APPEARANCES AND REALITIES: MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN HUMAN RELATIONS

83-84 (1970)

("We all have in everyday life the tendency to interpret and to evaluate the

behavior of other people in terms of specific personality characteristics
rather than in terms of specific social situations in which those people are
placed. More than that-the whole system of our sociomoral concepts such
as merit and guilt, success and failure, responsibility and the like, as accepted and applied in everyday life, is based on the assumption of a personal
rather than situational causation of human behavior.").
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rather than to situational influences-is known as the Correspondent Bias' 13 and is so pervasive and systemic that Professor Lee Ross named the bias the Fundamental Attribution Error. 114
A.

The FundamentalAttribution Error

When observers draw inferences on the causes of another's behavior, they systematically fail to take into account
situational factors.' 1 5 Even where situational factors fully account for another's behavior, people tend to infer that attitudes, personality traits, and enduring dispositions were the
causes for that behavior. 1 6 Researchers have found this persistent bias more dominant in Western cultures than in nonWestern cultures.]' 7
Professor George Quattrone developed a descriptive
model of the mental processes behind the Fundamental Attribution Error.' 18 He found that observers spontaneously attribute a connection between another's dispositions and behavior, and then adjust that attribution only if further deliberation warrants that they do so. Dispositional attributions are
fairly spontaneous, whereas the use of situational information
to discount the role of dispositions requires effortful deliberation.
Refining Quattrone's descriptive model, Professor Daniel
Gilbert and his colleagues found that the process of attribution comprises three sequential operations: a behavioral iden113. See FisKE, SocL

COGNITION,

supra note 108, at 67; Gilbert & Jones,

supra note 112.

114. See Ross & NISBErr, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION, supranote 16, at
125-34; FisKE, SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 108, at 67.
115. See Ross & NisBEr, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION, supranote 16, at
125-34; FisKE, SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 108, at 67.
116. See FisKE, SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 108, at 67; Lee D. Ross, Teresa M. Amabile & Julia L. Steinmetz, Social Roles, Social Control, and Biases in
Social-PerceptionProcesses, 35 J. PERSONALIlY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 485 (1977).
117. See ARONSON, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 108, at 103-05; Ara
Norenzayan & Richard E. Nisbett, Culture and Causal Cognition, 9 CURRENT
DIRECTION PSYCHOL. ScI. 132 (2000).
118. See generally Daniel T. Gilbert, Ordinary Personology, in THE HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 89, 113 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998)
[hereinafter, Gilbert, OrdinaryPersonology]; George A. Quattrone, Overattribution and Unit Formation: When Behavior Engulfs the Person, 42 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 593 (1982).
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tification stage ("categorization"), a dispositional inference
stage ("characterization"), and a situational adjustment stage
("correction")."i 9 The first two stages are relatively spontaneous, while the last stage requires conscious, controlled, effortful deliberation. When people have an interest in understanding other people's behavior, they consider the influence
of situational factors on behavior, but only after they have first
spontaneously characterized behavior in dispositional terms.
This research demonstrates that categorization and characterization are more automatic than correction. People who are
denied the opportunity to think deeply about behavior tend to
draw dispositional inferences, even after they are informed
that the behavior is linked to situational factors.120
The Fundamental Attribution Error is explained by a
number of heuristics, which Professors Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky introduced in several seminal publications. 121
Heuristics are mental shortcuts-rules of thumb-that reduce
complex and time-consuming tasks to more simple and efficient strategies for making judgments about uncertain
events.' 2 2
The Fundamental Attribution Error is explained, for example, by the representativeness heuristic and the anchoring and
adjustment heuristic. The representativeness heuristic applies to
categorization judgments.123 People often decide spontaneously whether an observed instance belongs to a particular category based on a crude assessment of similarity between that
instance and their expectations, schemas, or prototypical rep119. See generally Gilbert, Ordinary Personology, supra note 118, at 112;
Daniel T. Gilbert, Brett W. Pelham, & Douglass S. Krull, On Cognitive Busyness: When Person Perceivers Meet Persons Perceived, 54 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 940 (1988); Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Of Thoughts Unspoken: Social
Inference and the Self-Regulation of Behavior, 55 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
685 (1988).
120. See generally Gilbert, Ordinary Personology, supra note 118, at 112.
121. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristicfor
judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973); Lee Ross
& Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins and
Maintenanceof Erroneous Social Assessments, inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY.
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 129 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter
KAHNEMAN, HEURISTICS AND BIASES].

122. See

NISBETr, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF

SOCIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 21, at 7.
123. See FISKE, SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 108, at 382-83.
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resentations of that category, rather than on the basis of a
more rational comparison of the instance with all the defining
features of that category.12 4 Our prevailing expectancies or
schemas about human behavior are that others do what they
do because they are who they are, not because of situational
influences.1 25 Given these expectancies and schemas, people
spontaneously infer that another's behavior results from their
personality. Because spontaneous attributions are strongly
anchored to dispositional attributions, people insufficiently
adjust for situational influences.
The Fundamental Attribution Error is also explained, in
part, by the availability heuristic and salience heuistic. Actors in
the foreground are more salient than the environment in the
background.12 6 People focus on actors, not environments,
and people overestimate the causal significance of actors.
Problems arise when observers draw highly vivid causes from
memory, rather than concealed causes occurring in the background-such as the influence of environments on behavior.
Further, situational factors, social context, social roles, and situational pressures are often invisible, unlike the more dynamic and vivid behavior of actors. Because the actor dominates an observer's thinking, dispositional aspects are overrated as causally important.
Social psychologists have studied how to counteract the
Fundamental Attribution Error as well. Professor Douglas
Krull and his colleagues have evidenced that observers may attribute behavior spontaneously and effortlessly to either dispositional attributions or situational attributions. Krull found
that an observer's epistemic goals determine which of these
spontaneous attributions the observation will first evoke. 1 2 7
Gilbert and his colleagues had suggested that when observers
are interested in understanding an actor, observers always first
spontaneously categorize the actor's behavior, attributing be-

124. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
125. See ARONSON, SOCLAL PSYCHOLOCY, supra note 108, at 101; Gilbert, Ordinary Personology, supra note 118, at 132.
126. See generally Gilbert, OrdinaryPersonology, supra note 118, at 132 ("Behavior in particular has such salient properties it tends to engulf the total
field" of correspondence bias.).
127. See, e.g., Krull, supra note 25, at 345.
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havior in dispositional terms.12 8 Krull, however, evidenced
that when observers are interested in understanding the force
of an environment and situational influences on an actor, observers characterize the situational influence first and then,
through effortful deliberation, correct the situational attribution with information about an actor's dispositions. Krull
found that observers first attribute behavior as a manifestation
of the phenomenon that they most want to evaluate and then
consider the role that the other phenomena may have had in
causing behavior. 129 That is, social psychologists have shown
that the spontaneous inference process can be reversed if the
epistemic goal of the observer is to understand how situations
shape behavior.
B. Wen SituationalInfluences Shape Business Conduct, the
FundamentalAttribution Error Leads to Anomalous Results.
Whether a federal court will grant or deny a dispositive
motion often turns on whether the court perceives that the
defendants acted with scienter. Judicial decision-making on
the element of scienter, however, is affected by the persistent
bias of attributing the defendants' behavior to dispositional
factors and self-interest, rather than to situational influences. 3 0
128. See id.; see also Gilbert, Ordinary Personology, supra note 118, at 132
(stating that "when observers are interested in diagnosing an actor's dispositions, they draw dispositional inferences with relative ease and then correct
those inference with relative effort.").
129. See Krull, supra note 25; see also Aaron C. Kay, S. Christian Wheeler &
Dirk Smeesters, The Situated Person: Effects of Construct Accessibility on Situational Construals and Interpersonal Perception, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc.
PSYCHOL. 275 (2008). See generally Gilbert, Ordinary Personology, supra note
118, at 132 (discussing Krull's sequential operations model).
130. A number of studies have examined the Fundamental Attribution Error in the context of jury decision-making. See Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H.
Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions, a Review of the Literatureand Issues, 5
PSYCH. SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, no. 2 33-67 (Nov. 2004); Jeffrey S.
Neuschatz et. al., The Effects of Accomplice Witnesses andfailhouse Informants on
Jury Decision Making, 32 L. HUMAN BEHAV. 137-49 (2008); Saul M. Kassin, The
Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 221-233 (1997). The author, however, is aware of no empirical study that specifically examined the
degree to which federal judges display the Fundamental Attribution Error
when adjudicating cases. Researchers, however, have recently begun to conduct studies on how heuristics and the basic cognitive illusions that undergird the Fundamental Attribution Error affect federal judges. See, e.g., Cass
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By way of a hypothetical, consider the following situation:
Federal securities lawsuits often stem from a sudden decline in
value of the publicly-traded stock of a corporation ("Acme
Corp.") after business problems are reported by the media or
management. As a result, shareholders ("Plaintiffs") allege
that the directors and officers of Acme Corp. ("Defendants")
should have disclosed additional information about a business
condition earlier. Plaintiffs claim that Acme Corp.'s stock
price was artificially inflated because the Defendants had intentionally or recklessly misstated or omitted adverse information about Acme Corp.'s business condition in public filings.
Plaintiffs allege that, when they purchased shares of Acme
Corp., they relied on the presumption that Acme Corp.'s stock
value incorporated all material information about Acme Corp.
Plaintiffs, in turn, claim that, because the Defendants misstated adverse information, the value of Plaintiffs' investments
were artificially inflated and then declined once the falsity of
the misrepresentations were revealed.

Sunstein, Illusory Losses, in LAw & HAPPINESS (2010) ("The implication of the
legal system is clear. If ordinary people make mistakes in forecasting the
effects of adverse events in their own lives, there is every reasons [sic] to
think that juries (and judges) will make similar mistakes . . . ."); John C.
Anderson, D. Jordan Lowe & Philip M.J. Reckers, Evaluation of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYcHOL. 711,
725-27 (1993) (reporting a study of judges that tested for hindsight bias);
Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 982-89 (1994) (reporting the results of a study of the
incidence of egocentric bias among bankruptcy judges and lawyers); Chris
Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew Wistrich, Inside the JudicialMind, 86
[hereinafter Guthrie, Inside the Judicial
CORNELL L. REv. 777, 778 (2001)
Mind] ("[W]e found that each of the five illusions we tested had a significant
impact on judicial decision making. Judges, it seems, are human. Like the
rest of us, their judgment is affected by cognitive illusions that can produce
systematic errors in judgment."); Stephen Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A
PreliminaryInquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on judges and
juries in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 113 (1994) (reporting results of
experiment suggesting that judges and jurors may be similarly influenced by
exposure to potentially biasing information); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges
Think About Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 26 (1999) (reporting results of a
study of judges' biases); Roselle L. Wissler, Allen J. Hart & Michael J. Saks,
DecisionmakingAbout General Damages:A Comparison ofJurors,Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MIcH. L. REV. 751, 776, 786 (1999) (studying the factors that contribute to judges' assessments of the severity of injuries and judges' awards for
damages).
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Understanding how the Fundamental Attribution Error
affects judicial decision-making in this hypothetical first requires discussion of the Hindsight Bias.13 1 The hindsight bias
refers to the tendency to believe that one would have predicted an adverse result after learning of the eventual outcome. After the fact, outcomes appear obvious, predictable,
even inevitable. That is, people tend to exaggerate what could
have been predicted beforehand. Twenty-twenty hindsight is
robust.1 32 Because judges evaluate conduct after the fact,
judges are particularly vulnerable to the hindsight bias when
making determinations about whether conduct was reasonable
and whether the defendants knew or should have known
about the likelihood of an adverse result.13 3 This bias affects
liability and negligence judgments.13 4 Legal scholars have dis-

131. The Hindsight Bias has been demonstrated in a legion of empirical
studies. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight # Foresight: The Effects of Outcome
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: Hum.
PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975); Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, "I
Knew It Would Happen "-Remembered Probabilities of Once-Future Things, 13 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 1 (1975); Paul Slovic & Baruch
Fischhoff, On the Psychology of Experimental Surprises, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: HuM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 544 (1977). All confirm that
events seem far less obvious and predictable beforehand than in hindsight.
This point may seem obvious to the reader as well.
132. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 130, at 799-805 ("People tend to overstate their own ability to have predicted the past and believe
that others should have been able to predict events better than was possible.").
133. See Guthrie, Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 130, at 799-805 ("Because courts usually evaluate events after the fact, they are vulnerable to the
hindsight bias."); see alsoJeffreyJ. Rachlinksi, A Positive Psychological Theory of
Judging in Hindsight, in BEHAVIORAL LAw & ECONOMICS, supra note 13, at 98.
134. See Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade &John W. Payne,JurorJudgments in
Civil Cases: HindsightEffects on judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages, 23 L.
& Hum. BEHAV. 597, 609 (1999) ("Every measure of the probability of an
accident, responsibility for the accident, and liability was sensitive to the manipulation of temporal perspective.

. .

. We also found that the hindsight

effect was dispersed across several other inferences that are important in the
context of the punitive damages liability decision."); Kim A. Kamin &Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, Ex Post # Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 L. &
HuM. BEHAv. 89, 99 (1995); SusanJ. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinationsof
Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 20 L. & Hum. BEHAV. 501, 510-12 (1996);
Merrie Jo Stallard & Debra L. Worthington, Reducing the Hindsight Bias Utilizing Attorney Closing Arguments, 22 L. & Hum. BEHAV. 671, 680-81 (1998).
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cussed the hindsight bias in the context of federal securities
litigation.13 5
Differing from the hindsight bias, the Fundamental Attribution Error is a distinct phenomenon. The hindsight bias offers an incomplete account of the cognitive biases afoot when
courts adjudicate scienter. The hindsight bias suggests that
judges and juries will perceive events as more objectively predictable than they actually were, i.e., the way events unfolded
was obvious and predictable. However, the hindsight bias does
not further predict that judges and juries will infer subjective
intent from that belief.1 3 6 In contrast, the Fundamental Attribution Error signifies that, when judges and juries believe an
event was obvious and predictable, they will attribute subjective intent to the failure to remedy or report that event. After
the trier of fact perceives events as obvious in hindsight, judges
and juries are prone to spontaneously attribute fraudulent intent, rather than to seek out situational explanations. These
two cognitive biases, therefore, interact. But unlike the hindsight bias, social-psychological research shows that the Fundamental Attribution Error is remedied by examining first situational and then dispositional inferences. 3 7 This remedy,
therefore, reduces misattributions of intent and improves the
accuracy of judicial decision-making.
Returning to the hypothetical, with the benefit of hindsight, Plaintiffs characterize Acme Corp.'s business condition
as problematic, and obviously so. Plaintiffs claim that the De135. See Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud
By Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 773 (2004) (discussing the concern of courts
regarding "fraud by hindsight" in cases of securities fraud).
136. See id. at 789 n.71 ("The evidence that the hindsight bias has this
effect, however, is scant. Virtually all of the data on the hindsight bias speak
only to the objective judgment.").
137. See WILUAM JAMES, What PragmatismMeans, in PRAGMATISM 20 (Barnes
& Noble Books 2003) (1907) ("The pragmatic method ... is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to any one if this notion rather than that
notion were true?"); ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY: METHODOLOGY FOR BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 46 (Chandler Pub. Co. 1964) ("The position
just sketched, especially with reference to Dewey's elaboration of it, has
come to be known as instrumentalism. It identifies the procedures of analyzing concepts by an attempt to get at the use that is made of them. The
instrumentalist looks at the problems the concept is used to deal with, and at
the ways in which it contributes to the solution of those problems.").
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fendants either knew or should have known of the inevitable
result. Due to the Fundamental Attribution Error, the Plaintiffs then attribute dispositional factors to the decline in value
of Acme Corp.'s stock (dishonesty, gross incompetence, greed,
etc.) and to the failure to report problems sooner. The inference to be drawn from Defendants' failure to disclose
problems sooner is intentional wrongdoing, fraud.1 38
When behavior is ambiguous, judicial decision-makers
commit the Fundamental Attribution Error. That is, judicial
decision-makers spontaneously draw dispositional inferences
from ambiguous circumstances.1 3 9 This is problematic because after a business calamity, the stereotype that corporate
executives are greedy, self-serving, dishonest, and amoral
would be particularly salient. 1 4 0 Complicating the matter,
once ajudicial decision-maker arrives at the theory or expectation that dispositional factors caused Defendants' conduct, the
judicial decision-maker would more readily identify evidence
that confirms, rather than disconfirms, that expectation. 14 1
138. Two classic cases that discuss the hindsight bias are Denny v. Barber,
576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978) (Friendly, J.) and Dileo v. Ernst & Young,
901 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.).
139. See supra Section III.A.
140. See POSNER, HowJUDGEs THINK, supra note 15, at 95 ("Ajudge's professional experiences before he became a judge may have convinced him
that . . . a significant fraction of corporate executives are greedy, mendacious, and shortsighted. Such interpreted experiences could congeal into
(though could also be formed by) a general . . . antibusiness ideology that
would influence the judge's vote in close cases involving ... corporate executives accused of fraud."); see Tom Soter, Looking for Mr. Good Guy, 32 Am.
MGMT. Ass'N 33-36 (Aug. 1996); R.F. O'Neil, The Artist's Perception of the Typical Businessman: Selfish, Greedy, Conniving and Thoroughly Amoral, 8 INT'LJ. OF
Soc. ECON., iss. 4, at 31 (1981). Negative cultural stereotypes affect legal
decisions in decision-making in subtle, but significant ways. See Galen v.
Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making And Memory: Testing
Process Models of Stereotype Use,J. PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL., no. 5, at 72677 (1988).
141. This initial theory or expectation would operate much like a schema.
See generally FisKE, Social Cognition, supra note 108, at 96-141 (describing
biases that occur when using the attribution process). A schema is a cognitive structure that represents a decision-maker's prior knowledge or expectancy about stimuli, e.g., objects, persons, or situations. Schemas guide
processing of new information. Schemas create expectations about the kind
of information that will follow and help fill in missing information. Once
activated, a schema can change people's encoding of schema-related events,
so that what is noticed, remembered, and assumed is consistent with that
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A first hypothetical scenario in which the Fundamental
Attribution Error leads to anomalous results is the scenario
where Acme Corp. adopts a generally accepted business practice yielding a substantial source of revenue, but where that
business practice is later curtailed by regulators. For sake of
illustration, assume that Acme Corp. adopts the industry practice of exporting widgets to China. If China and/or U.S. Federal or State regulators later curtail that practice, Acme Corp.
would lose a substantial source of revenue. Regardless of
whether Acme Corp. disclosed that practice and related regulatory risks in periodic filings, the value of Acme Corp.'s publicly-traded stock would decline sharply after the media reports
these changes in the regulatory environment. In this scenario,
with the benefit of hindsight, Plaintiffs would claim that the
likelihood that Chinese and/or U.S. Federal or State regulators would curb Acme Corp.'s business practice was obvious
and that Acme Corp. could have and should have done more
to disclose that risk in public securities filings, such as its annual reports and 10-Ks.1 42
The problem, however, is that generally accepted business
practices operate as social norms, especially when businesses
are forced to make decisions in ambiguous situations. 143 Deschema. See id. Schemas are particularly likely to guide the collection of
data if the theory is held with great confidence, if it is very salient in the
theory holder's mind, and if the available data are sufficiently ambiguous
that they do not, in themselves, suggest an alternative theory. See id. at 350.
See generally Susan T. Fiske & Beth A. Morling, Schemas/Schemata, in THE
BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 489, 489-94 (Antony S.R.
Manstead et al. eds., 1996) (explaining different aspects of schema, including schema development, and schema stability versus change). Though he
called the concept "prior probabilities," Judge Posner articulated how
schemas influence judicial decision-making and drew on Bayseian decision
theory to show that prior probabilities influence judges' "posterior probabilities" and ultimate judgments. See POSNER, HowJUDGES THINK, supra note 15,
at 65-70.
142. Cf Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1989) (China imposed import restrictions, thereby restricting sales to customers in China, which impaired company's stock value and precipitated securities lawsuit).
143. Legal scholars have employed the term "social norm" in a variety of
senses, broadly and narrowly. See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and EconomicsDiscovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 549 (1998). Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 914 (1996) ("If a
definition is thought necessary, we might, very roughly, understand 'norms'
to be social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to
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scriptive social norms are inferred from what others do in
novel or ambiguous situations. 1 " People are motivated to
make accurate decisions. They observe how others behave because that behavior guides their impressions of the effectiveness of their own conduct. In ambiguous situations, people
rely on the "social reality" as displayed by peers. Peer behavior
provides consensus information: the greater the number of
peers who respond to the same situation in the same way, the
more adaptive and reasonable one perceives that behavior to
be. Researchers have shown people use evidence of how peers
behave to decide on the most effective course of action in
novel, ambiguous, or uncertain situations.' 4 5 As an adaptive
technique, people model their conduct on the behavior of
peers especially when those peers are perceived as exemplars
and successful.1 46 Significantly, researchers have shown that
people draw on the existence of descriptive social norms as
cues-not simply for what is reasonable or correct in a given
context-but as cues for what is lawful. That is, descriptive social norms subtly influence how people perceive what is
proper and lawful in a given context; this is a form of social
learning affected by environmental cues.14 7
be done and what ought not to be done."), with Eric Posner, Law, Economics,
and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1699 (1996) ("A norm can be
understood as a result that distinguishes desirable and undesirable behavior
and gives a third party the authority to punish a person who engages in the
undesirable behavior."). For present purposes, I refer to the construct both
in the injunctive sense described above, and in the sense employed by social
psychologists to describe the informational social influence of descriptive social norms. See ARONSON, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 108, at 214; RoBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 98-140, 155 (4th ed.
2001) [hereinafter CIALDINI, INFLUENCE]; Cialdini, Social Influence, supra note
16, at 155.
144. See ARONSON, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 108, at 214; CIALDINI,
INFLUENCE, supra note 143, at 98-137; Ross & NISBErr, THE PERSON AND THE
SITUATION, supra note 16, at 44; Cialdini, Social Inflence, supra note 16, at 155.
145. See ARONSON, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 108, at 214; CIALDINI,
Influence, supra note 143, at 98-137; Cialdini, Social Influence, supra note 16,
at 155; Ross & NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION, supra note 16, at 44.
146. See ARONSON, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 108, at 214; CIALDINI,
INFLUENCE, supra note 143, at 98-137; Ross & NISBETr, THE PERSON AND THE
SITUATION, supra note 16, at 44; Cialdini, Social Influence, supra note 16, at
155.
147. See, e.g., Ralph Hertwig, Do Legal Rules Rule Behavior?, in HEURISTICS
AND THE LAW, 391, 391410 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Christopher Engel eds.,
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When generally accepted business practices operate as social norms, these business practices have a normative and informational influence on conduct.'4 8 When industry peers
adopt a business practice, that behavior has an informational
influence on rivals, subtly shaping their perceptions of
whether to adopt the same business practice.1 4 9 This suggests
that peer behavior can influence not only the decision to
adopt a business practice per se, but also whether and how to
disclose the risks associated with that practice. That is, if most
successful peers do not dwell on the associated risks in, say,
industry trade shows, earnings conference calls, and public securities filings, their behavior would influence the risk perceptions and estimations of others and how others disclose the
same risks in their own public securities filings.150
In this first scenario, Acme Corp. adopted the industry
norm of exporting widgets to China and disclosed only certain
risks associated with that practice, like its peers. These decisions flow not from greed, dishonesty, or other dispositions,
but from the normative and informational influence of Acme
Corp.'s business environment. Its business environment resulted in imitation and conformity. Doubtless, generally accepted business practices can be wrongheaded in hindsight.
But federal securities laws compensate shareholders for fraud,
not when a company conforms to industry norms thought
foolish in hindsight.
A second hypothetical scenario where the Fundamental
Attribution Error leads to anomalous results is where success2006); Robert B. Cialdini, Descriptive Social Norms As UnderappreciatedSources of
Social Control, 72 PSYCHOMETRIKA 263 (2007).
148. See ARONSON, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 108, at 214; CIALDINI,
INFLUENCE, supra note 143, at 98-140; Cialdini, Social Influence, supra note 16,
at 155.
149. See Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J. Goldstein, Social Influence: Compliance
and Conformity, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 591, 606-613 (2004); Noah J. Goldstein, Robert B. Cialdini & Vladas Griskevicious, A Room with a Viewpoint:
Using Social Norms To Motivate Environmental Conservation in Hotels, 35 J. CONSUMER REs. 472, 479 (2008); Vladas Griskevicius, Robert B. Cialdini & Noah
J. Goldstein, Applying (and Resisting) Peer Influence, 49 MITSLOAN MGMT. REV.
84, 87 (2008) ("[M]anagers need to recognize the stealthy impact that
other's [sic] decisions can have on their own choices . . . .").

150. See Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: UnderstandingPerceived Risk, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 121, at 465 (discussing how
the availability heuristic leads to misperceptions of risk).
KAHNEMAN,
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ful peers make long-term decisions to invest in capital improvements abroad. Those decisions would likely shape Acme
Corp.'s predictions about the vitality of the business environment. Acme Corp.'s predictions would then, in turn, influence its business objectives, goals, and its decision to invest in
long-term capital improvements as well.
In this regard, Acme Corp. faces strong informational influence when successful peers invest in capital improvements.
In making an accurate prediction about the future of its business environment, Acme Corp. would be influenced by the decisions of peers because those decisions strongly signal vitality
in the industry. In this scenario, conformity is the likely result
for several reasons. When making predictions, organizations
commonly display a bias toward overly optimistic forecasts. 15'
This is especially so where the market rewards optimistic actions, for example, with inexpensive capital. When this occurs,
Acme Corp. would face normative influence by shareholders
and other stakeholders to conform as well. Considerable social psychological research has been conducted on a phenomenon that Professor John Bargh and his colleagues have described as goal contagion.152 Goal contagion describes the automatic adoption and pursuit of goals that one sees others strive
for. Researchers have shown when people perceive that
others' behavior signals pursuit of a particular goal representing a positive and desired state for the perceiver, people then
tend to imitate others in pursuing that goal.15 s This is especially so when others are significant to them, such as friends,
parents, spouses, and presumably, successful peers.15 4 It is
likely, therefore, that where successful peers invest in longterm capital improvements with the aim of competing in a for151. See Roger Buchler et al., Inside the Planning Fallacy: The Causes and
Consequences of Optimistic Time Predictions, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PsYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 250, 250 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin &
Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002); Paul Slovic, Facts Versus Fears: Understanding
Perceived Risk, in KAHNEMAN, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES, supra note 121, at 472.
152. See Ap Dijksterhuis et al., Effects of Primingand Perception on Social Behavior and Goal Pursuit, in SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE
AUTOMATIClY OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES 51, 100-07 (John A. Bargh ed.,
2007); Henk Aarts, Goal Contagion:PerceivingIsfor Pursuing,87J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 23, 24-25 (2004).
153. See Aarts, supra note 152, at 24-25.
154. See id.
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eign market, those decisions would have a strong normative
and informational influence on Acme Corp.'s own decisions to
invest abroad for better or worse.
This second hypothetical scenario again illustrates that
Acme Corp.'s business decisions may not flow from intentional
wrongdoing, but primarily from a reading of the social environment and the informational influence of peer behavior.
These two scenarios highlight norms external to a firm,
such as industry norms, that have profound normative and informational effects. In these scenarios, conformity stems from
social influence, not fraud. This is not to say that self-interest
does not motivate financial fraud,' 5 5 but rather that because of
the Fundamental Attribution Error, judges and juries would
likely misattribute fraud to innocent conduct in hindsight that
results from situational influences.
Situational influences, moreover, may arise internal to the
firm. For example, employees may conform to an organizational climate and culture. In this regard, Professor Donald
Langevoort has drawn on research on social cognition and
norm structures to describe how corporate cultural biases, including cognitive conservatism, over-optimism, over-commitment effects, and self-serving beliefs can lead managers to
make overly optimistic forward-looking disclosures and to fail
to sufficiently disclose problems relating to novel products.e5 6
Organizational cultures and situational influences within
firms shape behavior significantly. Social-psychological research could provide a method to develop nuanced rules to
more effectively regulate business environments and, therefore, to reshape and control behavior that might otherwise result in fraud.' 5 7 One significant social-psychological finding is
155. SeeJennifer H. Arlen & WilliamJ. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud
on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691 (1992) (explaining that significant portion of market frauds is driven by managers attempting to save their own jobs).
156. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of
Why CorporationsMislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms),
in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND EcoNoMics, supra note 13, at 144; Donald C.
Langevoort, Resetting the CorporateThermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial
Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls,
93 CEo. L.J. 285, 288 (2004).
157. See Robert B. Cialdini, ReneeJ. Bator & Rossana E. Guadagno, Normative Influences in Organizations,in SHARED COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE
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that executives and managers shape situational norms, corporate cultures, and organization climates (whether intending to
or not) and have the ability to change the cultures that permeate organizations. 15 8 Ordinary humans placed into environments with deplorable norms behave in deplorable ways. 159
When executives and managers fail to consider that a dishonest "tone on the top" shapes unethical behavior in their organizations, their reckless conduct may result in social harm and
financial-accounting fraud.o6 0 When dishonesty becomes an
accepted organizational norm-thereby becoming part of an
organizational culture and climate-a host of consequences
follow.' 6 ' While a dishonest business culture may lead to increased profits in the short term, long-term consequences include damage to an organization's reputation, loss of business
or clients, turnover by honest employees, theft, and importantly for present purposes, financial-reporting fraud. 162
A situational approach to the federal securities laws,
therefore, would examine both situational influences external
to the firm (such as generally accepted business conduct that
appears fraudulent only in hindsight) and situational influences internal to the firm (such as financial-reporting fraud
stemming from a corrupt corporate culture). That is, the situational approach could be used both as a shield by defendants
and as a sword by plaintiffs who seek to hold defendants liable
when they create corporate and industry-wide cultures that
cause financial-reporting fraud. The situational perspective
195, 196 (Leigh L. Thompson et al. eds., 1999)
[hereinafter Cialdini, Normative Influences in Organizations]; Goldstein,
Cialdini & Griskevicious, supra note 149, at 479; Janneke F. Joly, Diederik A.
Stapel & Siegwart M. Lindenberg, Silence and Table Manners: When EnvironMANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE

ments Activate Norms, 34

PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.

BULL. 1047 (2008);

Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
158. See Robert B. Cialdini, Petia K. Petrova & Noah J. Goldstein, The Hidden Costs of OrganizationalDishonesty, 45 MITSLOAN MGMT. REV. 67 (2004);
Harry Levinson, Why the Behemoths Fell, Psychological Roots of Corporate Failure,
49 AM. PSYCH., no. 5, at 428-36 (May 1994); Sunstein, supra note 157, at 903.
159. See generally PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECr: UNDERSTANDING
How GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007); Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of
Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 371 (1963).
160. See Milgram, supra note 159, at 371.
161. See Cialdini, Normative Influences in Organizations,supra note 157, at
203.
162. See id.; Cialdini, Petrova & Goldstein, supra note 158, at 67.
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could be used to make internal controls and legal rules more
nuanced, precise, and determinate.16 3 By focusing on situational influences in business environments, the situational perspective would more effectively deter financial fraud in these
environments. It would target the antecedents of financial
fraud-organizational norms and dishonest corporate cultures.16

IV.
THE TELLABS FRAMEWORK AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This article shows that the Tellabs framework shifts the epistemic inquiry at summary judgment and leads to more accurate judicial decision-making.16 5 The next issue is whether the
Tellabs framework could be woven into summary judgment in
federal securities cases, and if so, how? In short, one method
that would maintain reasonable regularity in the law stems
from the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence under Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Growth of jurisprudence is a craft that must be consistent
with reasonable regularity in the law and the leeway afforded
within precedent, particular doctrine, and patterns of cases. 166
That is, for Behavioral Realism to grow into the broad
branches of ourjurisprudence, legal scholars must identify leeway in the law sufficient for social-psychological findings to
take root. Where social-psychological science shows that juris163. This situational perspective is not novel and, in fact, has been incorporated into the federal sentencing guidelines manual for corporate organizations. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (a) (2008) ("[A]n
organization shall . .. (2) otherwise promote an organizational culture that
encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the
law."). See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character:A
Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Anima4 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004); Jon
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, CriticalRealism, PowerEconomics, and Deep Capture,152 U. PA. L. REv. 129
(2003).
164. The implications of this situational approach will be explored on another day in the author's future scholarship.
165. See CARDOzo, supra note 6, at 73.

166. See KARL. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 70-71 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2008) (1930); KAL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALs 213-35 (1960) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALs]; POSNER, HowJUDGES THINK, supra note 15,
at 230-65.
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prudence is based upon spurious presuppositions of human
nature that lead to unforeseen consequences, federal courts
may adapt that jurisprudence while maintaining reasonable
regularity in the law.1 67
The text of the PSLRA cannot serve as the source of authority for applying Tellabs at summary judgment. As discussed, the First and the Ninth Circuits diverge on whether the
PSLRA's heightened pleading standard applies at summary
judgment. 6 8 The First Circuit in Geffon v. Micrion Corp., found
the reasons for applying the PSLRA at the motion to dismiss
stage to be at least as forceful, if not more so, at summary judgment.169 First Circuit courts, therefore, employ the PSLRA's
"strong inference" language when adjudicating summary judgment.17 0 In contrast, in Howard v. Everex Systems, the Ninth Circuit applied the text of the PSLRA and determined that the
heightened standard is a pleading requirement, one that does
not change the substantive requirement for proving scienter at
summary judgment. 7' A sharp critique of the First Circuit's
approach was leveled by Judge Chesler in In re Bristol-Myers
Squibb Securities Litigation.172 There, the court applied the text
of the PSLRA to conclude that the PSLRA imposed a pleading
167. Karl Llewellyn referred to this manner of technique as the Grand
Tradition or the Manner of Reason. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 217
(1962) ("The essence is, I think, that every current decision is to be tested
against life-wisdom, and that the phrasing of the authorities which build our
guiding structure of rules is to be tested and is at need to be vigorously recast
in the new light of what each new case may suggest either about life-wisdom,
or about a cleaner and more usable structure of doctrine. In any event, and
as overt marks of the Grand Style: "precedent" is carefully regarded, but if it
does not make sense it is ordinarily re-explored; "policy" is explicitly inquired into; alleged "principle" must make for wisdom as well as for order if
it is to qualify as such, but when so qualified it acquires peculiar status."); see
also Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-theNext Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REv. 431, 457-60 (1930). See generally LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS, supra note 166, at 213-35; POSNER, How JUDGES
THINK, supra note 15, at 231 ("[T]he pragmatic vein in American judging is
wide and deep.").
168. See supra discussion and notes at Section II.C.
169. See Geffon v. Micrion Corp., 249 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2001).
170. See supra discussion and notes at Section II.C.
171. See id.
172. In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., No. Civ. A. 00-1990 (SRC), 2005
WL 2007004, at *1, *15 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2005); see infra discussion and notes

at Section V.
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requirement, not a substantive requirement. 173 The "plain
meaning rule" of statutory interpretation carries great weight
among jurists and is an oft-used heuristic for resolving disputes
about statutory interpretation. 174 This suggests that, outside
the First Circuit, most jurists would not find sufficient leeway
to incorporate Tellabs at summary judgment under the PSLRA
as a source of authority per se.
The Tellabs framework, however, could derive from Rule
56 and the requirement that plaintiffs must establish a genuine
issue of material fact as to scienter at summary judgment.
Under Rule 56, the chief inquiry at summary judgment is
whether plaintiffs have set forth sufficient evidence to establish
a genuine issue of material fact.175
This standard is best understood in light of the evolution
of federal jurisprudence at summary judgment. Jurists once
greeted motions for summary judgment with antipathy, and
summary judgment was once encumbered with ambiguity.17 6
173. In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 2007004, at *15; 15 U.S.C.

§ 78u-4(b) (3) (A) (1998) ("Dismissal for failure to meet pleading requirements"); see supra discussion and notes at Section I.B.
174. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 975-76
(9th Cir. 1999) ("To determine the proper pleading standard under the
PSLRA, we turn first to the text of the statute. If the language is plain and its
meaning clear, that is the end of our inquiry."). Justice Scalia is the flag
bearer of a strict textualist approach: "[W]e do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear." Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S.
135, 147 (1994). 'Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators'
intentions. Where the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to
replace it with an unenacted legislative intent." INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
175. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) ("The judgment sought should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and
any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.") (emphasis added). Effective December 1, 2010, the text of Rule 56(a) will provide, "[t]he
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. The change in wording from "issue" to "dispute" does not alter analysis. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note
(2010).
176. William W. Schwarzer, Alan Hirsch, David J. Barrans, The Analysis and
Decision of Summary judgment Motions: A Monograph on Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,139 F.R.D. 441, 446 (1992); DAVID F. HERR, ROGER S.
HAYDOCK & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, MOTION PRACTICE at 16.01 [A] (4th ed.
2005) [hereinafter, HERR, MOTION PRACTICE].

Imaged with
Permission
of N.Y.U.
Law & Business
HeinOnline
-- 7 N.Y.U.
J. L. &Journal
Bus. 238 of
2010-2011

2010]

(MIS)JUDGING INTENT

239

In 1975, for example, the Second Circuit characterized summary judgment as "a drastic device since its prophylactic function, when exercised, cuts off a party's right to present his case
to the jury." 77 Another illustration is the 1962 case of Pollerv.
Columbia BroadcastingSystem, where the Supreme Court advised
"summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation."1 7 8
Judicial intuitions, however, changed when jurists began
to perceive escalating costs in complex commercial matters
and the related need for case-management devices.' 7 9 In
1986, the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of summary judgment cases: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986);
Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); and MatsushitaElectric IndustrialCo. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). In
this trilogy, the Supreme Court built legitimacy into Rule 56
and a path toward effective use of Rule 56 in complex litigation matters.o8 0 In Celotex Corp., the Supreme Court re-characterized summary judgment not as "a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as
a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action.'"81 "Rule 56 must
be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in
fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also
for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to
demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to
trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual bases."' 8 2
Changing course in the context of complex antitrust litigation,
the Supreme Court explained "if the factual context renders
respondents' claim implausible-if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense-respondents must come for177. See Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d
Cir. 1975).
178. Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
179. See, e.g., Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1197 (5th Cir. 1986);
William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the FederalRules: Defining Genuine Issues of MaterialFact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 467 (1984) [hereinafter Schwarzer,
Summary judgment Under the Federal Rules].
180. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
181. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 327 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
182. Id.
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ward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim
than would otherwise be necessary." 8 In short, summary
judgment practice evolved after the Supreme Court created a
new decision-making schema in which federal courts now perceive summary judgment not only as a procedure for avoiding
unnecessary trials on insufficient claims, but also as an effective case management device for identifying and narrowing issues. 1 84
Matsushita provides leeway to develop this framework
under Rule 56. In Matsushita,the Supreme Court adjudicated
Rule 56 in light of antitrust law, but similar policy concerns
apply under the federal securities laws. Matsushita, therefore,
supports the view that "no genuine dispute as to any material
fact" means that a reasonable trier of fact could not return a
verdict for the non-moving party where the non-movant sets
forth insubstantial evidence of scienter. 185
In Matsushita, the Supreme Court discussed the requirement that non-moving parties may not rest upon the mere allegations in their pleading, but rather must set forth specific
facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.1 s6 There, plaintiffs, a group of American manufacturers of electronic consumer products charged thatJapanese manufacturers had conspired to fix and maintain predatory low prices on their products sold in the United States by, at the same time,
maintaining artificially high prices for their products sold in
Japan. The American manufacturers alleged the predatory
pricing conspiracy had harmed them. But the American manufacturers offered only circumstantial evidence of a predatory
pricing conspiracy, not direct evidence. 18 7
183. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
184. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592-93, 600 (1998); DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION § 11.34 (4th ed. 2005); Miller, From
Conley to Twombly to Iqbal, supra note 58, at 51 (Recently, "the Supreme
Court has transferred the primary gatekeeping function performed by summary judgment motions even earlier in the action to motions to dismiss.")
185. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (holding a
plaintiff survives motion for summary judgment if "evidence presented is
such that a reasonable jury might find that actual malice had been shown
with convincing clarity."); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 263.
186. Matsushita. 475 U.S. at 586-87.
187. Id. at 583-84.
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The MatsushitaCourt explained that in the absence of direct evidence of a predatory pricing conspiracy if the factual
context renders plaintiffs' claim economically implausible,
plaintiffs must come forward with persuasive evidence to support their claim.' 8 8 On a motion for summary judgment all
inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
opposing party. Antitrust law, however, limits the range of inferences that may be drawn from ambiguous evidence. Antitrust economic theory suggests predatory pricing conspiracies
are by nature speculative and not likely to occur. Therefore,
to survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must do
more than show there are two inferences that might be drawn
from the circumstantial evidence.'8 9 Rather, the non-moving
party must show the inference of conspiracy is reasonablein light of
the competing inference of independent action or collusive action that
could not have harmed the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court emphasized courts should not permit factfinders to infer conspiracies
when inferences are implausible, because the consequence
would be to deter pro-competitive conduct, chilling the very
conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. 190
While Matsushitastems from substantive antitrust law, the
same rationale extends by analogy in the federal securities
context where drawing an adverse inference from ambiguous
circumstances chills economic activity and results in undesirable social and economic consequences.19 1 All else being
equal, conformity to situational factors and social norms-including generally accepted business practices-is desirable
conduct, not fraudulent.19 2 Accepted business practices signal
the boundaries of permissible conduct and operate like heuristics. Holding liable those who conform to prevailing norms
would thwart an important and efficient business heuristic.
Here, the significance of Matsushita is especially relevant
where plaintiffs offer no direct evidence of fraud, but rather
188. Id. at 587-88.
189. Id. at 586-88.
190. Id. at 594.
191. See Schwarzer, The Analysis and Decision of Summary judgment Motions,
supra note 180, at 492. Drawing on Matsushita at the summary judgment
stage would retain the close parallel between complex antitrust litigation
and federal securities litigation at both the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment stages.
192. See text and notes, supra, at Section VI.B.
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only circumstantial evidence of a fraudulent scheme. And the
analogy is especially strong where plaintiffs offer only weak circumstantial evidence, failing to show that the defendants received any "concrete benefits" from the alleged fraud.19 3 The
non-moving party must do more than show a culpable inference could be drawn from conduct that is consistent with
nonculpable situational influences. The non-moving party
must show that the culpable inference is plausible and reasonable in light of the competing inference that the defendants
conduct resulted from nonculpable situational influences.
In Tellabs, the Supreme Court held that the strength of an
inference as inherently comparative.19 4 Whether an inference
of scienter is sufficiently genuine is also inherently comparative.
To establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to scienter,
plaintiffs must set forth facts giving rise to a cogent inference
that the defendants acted with scienter. Federal courts cannot
evaluate the genuineness of a dispute of material fact on scienter in a vacuum. The inquiry is comparative: How likely is it
that one conclusion, as compared to others, follows from the
underlying facts? Where a defendant advances its own cogent
nonculpable explanations for defendant's conduct, then a federal district court should contrast that cogent inference
against the inference favoring the plaintiff. To establish a genuine dispute of material fact on scienter, plaintiffs must set
forth facts from which an inference of scienter may be drawn
that is more than merely plausible or reasonable-it must be
cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of
non-fraudulent intent.19 5
The statutory language of Section 10(b) and its legislative
history support this jurisprudential approach. Section 10(b)
prohibits only intentional harm, not unintentional (negligent)
harm. 196 In Ernst & Ernst, the Supreme Court concluded that
the words "manipulative or deceptive" used in conjunction
193. See Ind. Elec. Workers' Pension Trust Fund v. Shaw Group, Inc., 537
F.3d 527, 543 (5th Cir. 2008) ("To demonstrate motive, plaintiffs must show
concrete benefits that could be realized by one or more of the false statements and wrongful nondisclosures alleged.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
194. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007).
195. See Geffon v. Micrion Corp., 249 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2001); cf Tellabs,
Inc., 551 U.S. at 323.

196. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
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with "device or contrivance" strongly suggest that Congress intended Section 10(b) to reach knowing or intentional misconduct only.19 7 The Supreme Court expressly held that, unlike
the express civil remedies in the 1933 Act, Section 10(b) does
not embrace negligence as a standard of liability.' 98 Turning
to the legislative history, there is no indication in the legislative history that Section 10(b) was intended to reach unintentional conduct.19 9 Given that the Fundamental Attribution Error leads to spurious attributions of intentionality where conduct appears unreasonable in hindsight (that is, appears
negligent in hindsight), the Tellabs framework ensures that
Section 10(b) reaches only the harm Congress sought to address.
With this background in place, the Second Circuit's standard in Press v. Chemical Inv. Serw. Corp. must be revisited. 20 0
There, the Second Circuit explained that questions of intent
are generally questions of fact appropriate for resolution at
trial and that the Second Circuit "has been lenient in allowing
scienter issues to withstand summary judgment based on fairly
tenuous inferences." 20 ' Whether a defendant acted with scienter is an issue of fact, 2 02 but to proceed to trial the factual issue
must be genuine. The Second Circuit's statement that scienter
issues regularly proceed to trial on fairly tenuous inferences is
inconsistent with its jurisprudence and a large body of federal
jurisprudence. As previously discussed, in many cases in which
Second Circuit courts adjudicate defendants' motions for summary judgment, and in virtually all cases in which they adjudicate the SEC's affirmative motions for summary judgment,
Second Circuit courts do not mention Press and, in fact, grant
summary judgment on the issue of scienter. 20s The Press stan197. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
198. Id. at 207-210.
199. Id. at 203.
200. See Press v. Chemical Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir.
1999); see also text and notes, supra at Section II.C.
201. See Press, 166 F.3d at 538; see also text and notes, supra at Section II.C.
202. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1788 (2010) ("Scienter is assuredly a 'fact."'); see also text and notes, supra at Section V.
203. See text and notes, supra, at Section II.C.; see, e.g., Vaughn v. Teledyne,
Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Cases where intent is a primary
issue generally are inappropriate for summary judgment . .. [yet] the plaintiff [the non-movant] must present significant probative evidence relevant to
the issue of intent, e.g., the time, place or nature of the alleged fraudulent
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dard represents the judicial experience reflected in Poller a
decision-making schema that has since been largely displaced
by the Supreme Court's summary judgment trilogy and Matsushita.
The final issue is whether federal courts could apply the
Tellabs framework at summary judgment in light of the Seventh Amendment. Here too there is sufficient leeway. Because Tellabs does not require federal courts to resolve factual
issues, but merely determine whether there exists a genuine
dispute of material fact, the framework does not violate the
Seventh Amendment. 20 4 The Supreme Court's summary judgment trilogy suggests that when the claimant raises a dispute
but does not produce supporting evidence sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict, the court may grant summary judgment on the ground that the claimant has not set
forth a genuine dispute. 2 05
In this regard, the Tellabs Court concluded that comparing plausible inferences of intent, while constantly assuming
the plaintiffs allegations to be true, does not impinge upon
the Seventh Amendment. 206 Tellabs requires plaintiffs to prove
facts rendering an inference of scienter at least as likely as any
plausible opposing inference. This does not force plaintiffs to
prove more than they would be required to prove at trial. At
trial, plaintiffs would be required to prove that it is more likely
than not that the defendants acted with scienter.2 0 7 Hence,
applying the Tellabs framework at summary judgment is consistent with modern experience in which the Supreme Court has
activities; mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to require that the motion for summary judgment be denied."); SEC v. Ficken, 546 F.3d 45, 51 (1st
Cir. 2008) ("Even in cases where elusive concepts such as motive or intent
are at issue, summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party
rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.").
204. 10A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2714 (3d ed. 1998, Supp. 2000); see also
United States v. Burket, 402 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1968) ("It is not the purpose
of Rule 56 to deny litigants the right of a trial if they really have issues to
try.").
205. See Allen R. Kamp, FederalAdjudication ofFacts: The New Regime, 12 AM.
J. TRIAL ADvoc. 437, 451 (1989); Schwarzer, The Analysis and Decision of Summary Judgment Motions, supra note 176, at 487-92.
206. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328 (2007).
207. Id. at 328-29.
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entrusted federal district courts as gatekeepers who perform a
limited judicial assessment of the plausibility of claims. 2 0 s To
be sure, there are valid concerns about the prudence of
gatekeeping in other contexts (such as in civil rights and discrimination cases) .209 But federal district judges are the de
facto triers of fact of federal securities disputes. The question is
whether their decisions will be based upon sound practical experience informed by advances in the social sciences. 2 10
CONCLUSION

This article focuses chiefly on the systemic bias and misattribution known as the Fundamental Attribution Error, and
Tellabs's effect in rectifying it. When viewed from a social-psychological perspective, Tellabs promotes effective judicial-decision making. Tellabs broadens the epistemic goal of decisionmaking by requiring federal courts to compare and contrast
culpable and non-culpable explanations for behavior. This decision-making approach increases the likelihood that federal
courts will consider situational and environmental causes for
conduct. Jurists would tend to avoid the Fundamental Attribu208. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
209. Given the dearth of trials in the federal securities context and the
countervailing concern that such lawsuits will chill lawful economic conduct,
these arguments carry less weight here. See Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal,
Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CuRK L. REv.
157 (2010) (claiming the Iqbal framework will undermine civil rights litigation); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal
Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 65 (2010) (arguing heightened pleading standards
will have a chilling effect on civil rights cases). A future direction of the
author's research is the question of whether gatekeeping at the pleading
stage should be made less exacting in federal civil rights cases given the effect of subtle stereotypes and cognitive biases. See Susan T. Fiske, Social Cognition and the Normality of Prejudgment,in ON THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE, FirrY
YEARS AFTER ALLPORT 36, 38-40 (John F. Dovidio et al. eds., 2005) (explaining how everyday decision-making leads to cognitive biases).
210. CARDozo, supra note 6, at 59. ("There have been two paths, each
open, though leading to different goals. The fork in the road has not been
neutralized for the traveler by a barrier across one of the prongs with the
label of "no thoroughfare." He must gather his wits, pluck up his courage,
go forward one way or the other, and pray that he may be walking, not into
an ambush, morass, and darkness, but into safety, the open spaces, and the
light.").
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tion Error and make more accurate decisions. Tellabs, therefore, offsets the tendency to over-attribute fraudulent intent to
conduct that appears unreasonable only in hindsight.
Whether Tellabs is sufficient to rectify this well-documented social-psychological phenomenon is an empirical question requiring future research.
Advancing a perspective rooted in Behavioral Realism, I
have proposed reconstruction of the inquiry at summary judgment in the federal securities context. This reconstruction derives from Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
is consistent with a constellation of recent summary judgment
jurisprudence, including the Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita. The Tellabs framework, therefore, could be operationalized at summary judgment under Rule 56, while maintaining
reasonable regularity in the law.
A situational approach, moreover, should be employed to
address more effectively the environmental antecedents of
fraud: organizational norms, dishonest corporate cultures, and
those who shape organizational cultures. A growing body of
social-psychological research demonstrates that organizational
cultures and business environments affirmatively shape behavior within those environments for better (and worse). When
corporate executives create organizational cultures and social
environments that lead to fraud, it may be, for example, that a
firm has breached its duty under the federal securities laws to
implement effective internal controls.
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